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GENERAL PROPERTIES OF BAYESIAN LEARNING AS
STATISTICAL INFERENCE DETERMINED BY CONDITIONAL
EXPECTATIONS
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Department of Algebra, Budapest University of Technology and Economics
and
MIKLÓS RÉDEI
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
London School of Economics and Political Science
Abstract. We investigate the general properties of general Bayesian learning, where “general
Bayesian learning” means inferring a state from another that is regarded as evidence, and where
the inference is conditionalizing the evidence using the conditional expectation determined by a
reference probability measure representing the background subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian
Agent performing the inference. States are linear functionals that encode probability measures by
assigning expectation values to random variables via integrating them with respect to the probability
measure. If a state can be learned from another this way, then it is said to be Bayes accessible
from the evidence. It is shown that the Bayes accessibility relation is reflexive, antisymmetric, and
nontransitive. If every state is Bayes accessible from some other defined on the same set of random
variables, then the set of states is called weakly Bayes connected. It is shown that the set of states is
not weakly Bayes connected if the probability space is standard. The set of states is called weakly
Bayes connectable if, given any state, the probability space can be extended in such a way that the
given state becomes Bayes accessible from some other state in the extended space. It is shown that
probability spaces are weakly Bayes connectable. Since conditioning using the theory of conditional
expectations includes both Bayes’ rule and Jeffrey conditionalization as special cases, the results
presented generalize substantially some results obtained earlier for Jeffrey conditionalization.
§1. Review of main results. In this paper we investigate the general properties of gen-
eral Bayesian learning. The investigation is motivated by the observation that the properties
of Bayesian learning we wish to determine do not seem to have been analyzed in the liter-
ature on Bayesianism on the level of generality we aim at here. (For monographic works
on Bayesianism we refer to [3, 23, 47]; for papers discussing basic aspects of Bayesianism
see [10, 11, 19–22, 45, 46].)
In particular, in this paper we take the position that the proper general technical device
to perform Bayesian conditioning is the theory of conditional expectations. The concept
of conditional expectation was introduced into probability theory by Kolmogorov in 1933
together with his axiomatization of probability theory, which has made probability theory
part of measure theory [29] (Doob [5] puts Kolmogorov’s work into historical context).
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Since Kolmogorov’s work, conditioning using the theory of conditional expectations has
become standard in mathematics [1, 2, 6, 12, 37, 41]. Both the elementary Bayes’ rule
(sometimes called “strict conditionalization”) and Jeffrey conditionalization (also called
“probability kinematics” [26]) can be recovered as special cases of conditioning using the
theory of conditional expectations; although, somewhat surprisingly, the fact that Jeffrey
conditionalization is indeed a special case of conditioning via conditional expectations
does not seem to be well known: Jeffrey does not refer to the theory of conditional expecta-
tions when introducing his rule of conditionalization in [26], nor do standard mathematical
works on probability theory [1, 2, 12, 37, 41] mention Jeffrey conditionalization when dis-
cussing the concept of conditional expectation. With very few exceptions (e.g., [8, 9, 24])
philosophical work on Bayesianism has not made extensive and systematic use of the
general theory of conditional expectations as conditioning device.
Proper handling of conditioning via conditional expectation requires one to go beyond
the framework of additive measures on Boolean algebras and forces one to work with posi-
tive, normalized, linear functionals (called “states”) that assign finite expectation values to
random variables via integrating them with respect to probability measures on the Boolean
algebra. Viewed from this more general perspective, conditioning can be regarded as a
map in the state space that takes a state as input and yields another, the conditioned state,
as output. Conditioning is thus a map in the dual space of the function space consisting of
integrable random variables. Bayesian conditioning is distinguished among the logically
possible conditioning maps in the dual space by the fact that it is the dual of a specific
map (a projection) on the function space representing the random variables that are inte-
grable with respect to the background probability of the Bayesian Agent. This projection
on the function space is the conditional expectation. Bayesian conditionalization based
on the technique of conditional expectations as conditioning device thus defines a two-
place relation in the state space of integrable random variables. We call this relation the
“Bayes accessibility relation” (Definition 4.2). The interpretation of the Bayes accessibility
relation is that if a state is Bayes accessible from another, then the Bayesian Agent can infer
this state from the evidence represented by the other state, where the inference is a single
Bayesian conditionalizing using the technique of conditional expectation determined by the
Agent’s background probability. Characterizing the Bayes accessibility relation amounts
then to characterizing Bayesian learning based on a fixed background measure in this
general setting.
Note that regarding Bayesian learning this way as a specific type of probabilistic
inference based on conditionalization as an inference device amounts to an interpretation
of conditionalization that differs slightly from what is common in situations in which
conditionalization is not via the most general technique of conditional expectations but via
the Bayes or Jeffrey rules. The difference is reflected in our terminology, which differs from
the standard one: We say that a state is inferred from another (evidence) on the basis of a
background measure via conditionalization determined by the background measure; equiv-
alently: that the evidence is conditionalized using the conditional expectation determined
by the background measure (prior) to obtain the inferred, conditioned state (posterior). The
standard way of expressing this would be to say that one conditionalizes the background
measure (prior) on the evidence to obtain the posterior. We believe that our terminology
indicates well the logical aspects and structure of conditionalizing via general conditional
expectations. Our terminology also is in harmony with the one used in some approaches
to conditionalization in physics (see e.g., [31–33]). More will be said on this in §3, see
especially Remark 3.4.
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Using the Bayes accessibility relation, one also can define another relation1: one that
connects a state defined by a probability measure not to the evidence from which it can be
learned via conditionalization determined by a fixed background measure but to the back-
ground probability measure on the basis of which the (posterior) state can be learned from
some evidence (Definition 4.3). We call this relation the “prior-posterior relation”. The
prior-posterior relation reflects another aspect of general Bayesian learning. Describing
properties of the Bayes accessibility and prior-posterior relations amounts to characterizing
Bayesian learning based on the concept of conditional expectation as a general inference
device. This is what we do in this paper. In the rest of this introduction we review (without
using any technical notation) first the results on the Bayes accessibility relation that con-
nects the evidence to the inferred (posterior) probability. The results on the prior-posterior
relation are summarized at the end of the introduction.
The Bayes accessibility relation is trivially reflexive—every state can be inferred from
itself trivially. The first nontrivial result of the paper is that the Bayes accessibility relation
is antisymmetric (Proposition 5.1). Antisymmetry of the Bayes accessibility relation entails
that a state space is not strongly Bayes connected: It is not true that any two states are Bayes
accessible from each other. In other words, Bayesian learning has a certain directedness built
into it: if a state can be learned from another that represents evidence, then the converse is
not true, Bayesian learning in the reversed direction is not possible (assuming that the two
states are different). This seems an intuitively attractive feature of Bayesian learning: what
one can learn from evidence cannot serve as evidence to learn the evidence itself.
We then ask the question of whether state spaces are weakly Bayes connected: is it true
that every state is Bayes accessible from some other state (Definition 6.1)? Weak Bayes
connectedness means that for every probability measure there exists some evidence from
which the Bayesian Agent can learn that probability by conditionalization with respect
to his fixed background degree of belief. Failure of weak Bayes connectedness means
that, given the background measure of the Bayesian Agent, there exist states (probability
measures) that the Agent cannot learn via Bayesian statistical inference no matter what evi-
dence formulated in the given state space he is presented with. Thus weak Bayes
connectedness of the state space would be a sign of strength of Bayesian learning–failure of
weak connectedness sets a strong limit to Bayesian learning in the given context. We give
a characterization of weak Bayes connectedness of state spaces (Proposition 6.2). This
result is used then to show that state spaces of standard probability spaces are not weakly
connected (Propositions 6.7 and 6.8). Standard probability spaces include essentially all the
probability spaces that occur in applications of probability theory; in particular, probability
spaces with a finite number of random events, and probability theories in which probability
is given by a density function with respect to the Lebesgue measure, are standard. In fact,
we prove more: in case of a standard probability space there exist an uncountably infi-
nite number of probability measures that are inaccessible for the Bayesian Agent (Propo-
sitions 6.10 and 6.11). Note that since conditioning now is with respect to conditional
expectations, not via the simple Bayes’ rule, the existence of Bayes inaccessible states
stated by Propositions 6.7, 6.10, and 6.11 has nothing to do with the well known fact that
a measure which is obtained from another via the simple Bayes’ rule will have to take zero
value whenever the prior measure takes on value zero (absolute continuity of conditional
probability with respect to prior) and that therefore a lot of measures (for instance all
faithful probability measures) cannot be obtained as the result of conditionalizing another
1 We thank two anonymous referees for suggesting to analyze this relation as well.
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4 ZALÁN GYENIS AND MIKLÓS RÉDEI
measure via the simple Bayes’ rule. (A probability measure is faithful if all nonzero events
have nonzero probability. (In the philosophy of probability literature faithful probability
measures are also called “regular”.) A faithful conditional probability measure appears in
Example 7.2.) The uncountably infinite number of Bayes inaccessible states displaying
the failure of weak Bayes connectedness of standard probability spaces are all absolutely
continuous with respect to the Agent’s background probability.
Proposition 6.2, which characterizes weak Bayes connectedness, makes it possible to
formulate a condition sufficient to entail that a state space is weakly Bayes connected
(Proposition 6.5). Based on this latter condition we give an example of a probability
space whose state space is weakly Bayes connected. But the significance for Bayesian
learning of the probability space with this weakly Bayes connected state space might be
very limited because the cardinality of the Boolean algebra of this weakly Bayes connected
state space is much larger than that of the continuum. Thus, only Bayesian Agents capable
of comprehending an enormous amount of propositions would be in the position to have
degrees of belief in every proposition in such a large set. Whether the notion of Bayesian
Agent should include Agents with such extraordinary mental skills, is questionable. In the
typical situations when one deals with probabilistic modeling, the concept of a Bayesian
Agent with more modest mental powers is sufficient. But in such contexts inaccessibility
of certain states via Bayesian inference is the general rule.
Failure of weak Bayes connectedness leads to the question of whether state spaces are
weakly Bayes connectable: Whether for every state (in particular for a state that is not
Bayes accessible from any other state in the given probabilistic framework) there exists a
richer probability theory into which the original can be embedded in such a way that the
Bayes inaccessible state becomes Bayes accessible from some state in the richer framework
(Definition 8.2). We show that state spaces are weakly Bayes connectable (Proposition 8.3).
This result generalizes the ones obtained by Diaconis and Zabell for the simple Bayes’ rule
and for Jeffrey conditionalization [4] (also see [14]). Weak Bayes connectability of state
spaces means that everything that can be formulated by the Bayesian Agent in terms of a
given probability space, can in principle be learned by the Agent by Bayesian upgrading—
provided that the Agent is allowed to enlarge the propositional basis of his degrees of belief
in a consistent manner. We will call this latter upgrading situation “Unlimited Evidence
Upgrading” scenario, in contradistinction to the “Limited Evidence Upgrading” situation,
in which the evidence available to the Agent is restricted to the set of all states on a given set
of random variables. Thus under the Unlimited Evidence Upgrading conditions a Bayesian
Agent has a potentially unlimited Bayesian learning capacity.
Weak Bayes connectability of state spaces raises the question of whether state spaces are
strongly Bayes connectable: whether it is true that any state can be made Bayes accessible
from any other by embedding both into a larger state space (Problem 8.6). This problem
remains open.
We will also show that the Bayes accessibility relation is not transitive (Proposition 7.1).
Lack of transitivity of the Bayes accessibility relation makes the following definition of
finite Bayes accessibility nonredundant: a state is finitely Bayes accessible from another if
it can be obtained as a result of a finite number of successive conditionalizations from
this latter state (Definition 7.3). The interpretation of finite Bayes accessibility is that
the Agent can genuinely Bayes-learn from error and feedback: the Agent can learn a
(finitely Bayes accessible) state from some evidence in several steps, in each step correcting
the state inferred in the preceding step by taking into account information that confirms
some of the inferred probabilities as correct, while keeping his background probability
fixed. Viewed from the perspective of this learning process, lack of transitivity of Bayes
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accessibility means that while the Bayesian Agent might be able to learn a state by starting
the learning process from an initial evidence and performing several successive steps of
conditionalizing based on feedback, the Agent will not in general be able to cut short the
learning process by replacing the chain of learning steps by a single Bayesian learning
move—“there is no Bayesian royal road to learning”.
The notion of finite Bayes accessibility leads naturally to the question of whether state
spaces are finitely weakly Bayes connected: is it true that every state is finitely Bayes
accessible from some other state (Definition 7.4)? Since finite weak Bayes connectedness
is a weakening of the simple weak Bayes connectedness, it is easier, in principle, for a state
space to be finitely weakly Bayes connected than just being Bayes connected. But a simple
argument shows that state spaces that are not weakly Bayes connected are not finitely
weakly Bayes connected either (Proposition 7.5). This entails that standard probability
spaces are not finitely weakly connected (Proposition 7.6). Thus, although a Bayesian
Agent can learn much more starting from a given evidence if given feedback and allowed
to correct the inferred states in a finite series of successive conditionalizations that uses
the feedback, there exist states that remain inaccessible for the Agent no matter from what
evidence he starts learning and no matter how many (but finite) times he is given feedback.
It will be seen that the prior-posterior relation is identical to the absolute continuity rela-
tion between probability measures. Hence it is reflexive, transitive, and it is not symmetric
and not antisymmetric. We will also ask whether the set of probability measures on a
σ -algebra is weakly connected with respect to the prior-posterior relation: Is it true that for
any probability measure on a σ -algebra there exists another that can serve as a background
on the basis of which the Bayesian Agent can learn the probability in a nontrivial way
from some evidence? This problem remains open in its full generality. But we isolate
conditions under which such a suitable background probability exists (Proposition 4.4).
Those sufficient conditions can hold in measure spaces with a finite Boolean algebra, and
also in spaces where probabilities are given by a density with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. Thus, given a probability measure to be learned in a typical application, there
exists a Bayesian Agent with a background probability who can learn the probability
measure in question from some evidence on the basis of this background. At the same
time, failure of weak and finite weak Bayes connectedness of state spaces shows that this
very background makes it impossible for the Agent to learn a lot of other probabilities. This
underscores the crucial importance of prior probability in Bayesian learning: A Bayesian
Agent always comes equipped with a probability measure that represents the Agent’s
background beliefs. No matter what this belief is, there will always be an uncountably
infinite number of probability measures (all absolutely continuous with respect to the prior
of the Agent) that the Agent cannot learn by conditionalization, no matter what evidence he
is presented with in the given framework. The set of Bayes inaccessible states is a “blind-
spot” of the Bayesian Agent and we regard this “Bayes-blindness” of a Bayesian Agent a
serious challenge for Bayesianism.
Existence of nonempty Bayes Blind Spots leads to several questions: One is how
presence of nonempty Bayes Blind Spots is compatible with the phenomenon known as
“washing out of priors”? This question will be answered in §7 by recalling Earman’s [8]
formulation of “washing out of priors” in terms of Doob’s martingale theorem, and clar-
ifying the relation of the martingale theorem to the concept of finite Bayes accessibility.
Other natural questions concern the relationship between Bayes Blind Spots and priors.2
2 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out such questions.
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6 ZALÁN GYENIS AND MIKLÓS RÉDEI
For instance: Are there states that are in the Bayes Blind Spot of many choices of priors?
How are the Bayes Blind Spots of different priors related? We do not know the answers to
these questions; these are interesting and nontrivial open problems to investigate further.
Another natural question concerns the size of the Bayes Blind Spot determined by a given
background probability. The size of the Bayes Blind Spot could be determined in the case
of probability spaces with a finite Boolean algebra [16] but the question is open even in
case of standard probability spaces.
The structure of the paper is the following. §2 fixes notation and recalls some basic
definitions and facts from the theory of conditional expectations. §3 defines conditional
probability in terms of conditional expectations and shows how elementary Bayesian
upgrading and Jeffrey conditionalization obtain as special cases of conditionalization via
conditional expectation. §4 defines the Bayes accessibility relation. §5 proves that the
Bayes accessibility relation is antisymmetric and discusses failure of strong Bayes con-
nectedness of state spaces. §6 analyzes weak Bayes connectedness and proves that state
spaces of standard probability spaces are not weakly Bayes connected. §7 proves failure
of transitivity of Bayes accessibility, defines the finite Bayes accessibility relation and
discusses finite weak Bayes connectedness. §8 proves weak Bayes connectability of state
spaces. §9 summarizes the main points with some further comments.
§2. Conditional expectations. We fix some notation that will be used throughout the
paper. (X,S, p) denotes a probability measure space: X is the set of elementary events,
S is a σ -algebra of some subsets of X , p is a probability measure on S . The negation
of event A ∈ S is denoted by A⊥. Given (X,S, p), Ls(X,S, p) denotes the set of
f : X → IR measurable functions such that | f |s is p-integrable. Of special importance
are the integrable (s = 1), the square-integrable (s = 2), and the (essentially) bounded
functions, the latter corresponds, formally, to s = ∞. Since p is a bounded measure, we
have (cf. [42, p. 71], [43])
L∞(X,S, p) ⊂ L2(X,S, p) ⊂ L1(X,S, p). (1)
Identifying functions that are equal except on p-measure zero sets, one obtains the corre-
sponding spaces Ls(X,S, p) consisting of equivalence classes of functions (notice the nota-
tional difference betweenL and L). In what follows, in harmony with the usual mathematical
practice, we use the same letters f, g etc. to refer to both functions (elements ofLs(X,S, p))
and equivalence classes of functions (elements of Ls(X,S, p)). The characteristic (indica-
tor) functions χA of the sets A ∈ S are in Ls(X,S, p) for all A ∈ S .
The probability measure p extends from S to a linear functional φp on Ls(X,S, p) by
the integral:
φp( f ) .=
∫
X
f dp f ∈ Ls(X,S, p) (2)
The value of φp on a characteristic function χA of A ∈ S is just the p-probability of A:
φp(χA) =
∫
X
χAdp =
∫
A
dp = p(A) (3)
The map f → ‖ f ‖2s .= φp(| f |s) defines a seminorm ‖ · ‖s on Ls(X,S, p) (only a
seminorm because in the function space Ls(X,S, p) functions differing on p-probability
zero sets are not identified). The linear functional φp is continuous in the seminorm ‖ · ‖s .
The seminorm ‖·‖s becomes a norm on Ls(X,S, p). The containment relation (1) is dense
when Ls (s = 1, 2,∞) are considered as normed spaces.
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By definition, a state φ on Ls(X,S, p) is a linear functional on Ls(X,S, p) that is
positive (i.e., φ( f ) ≥ 0 if f ≥ 0), continuous in the ‖ · ‖s seminorm and normalized
φ(1) = 1, where 1 denotes the characteristic function χX of the whole set X . States yield
probability measures when restricted to the (characteristic functions of elements of the)
σ -algebra S . States thus encode probability measures via the integral (2).
REMARK 2.1. Since states on Ls(X,S, p) are ‖ · ‖s -continuous linear functionals by
definition, all the probability measures obtained from states on Ls(X,S, p) by restrict-
ing them to the (characteristic functions of the) σ -algebra S are absolutely continuous
with respect to p. Thus, if f = g almost p-everywhere, then for any state φ we have
φ( f ) = φ(g). From this it follows that states on Ls(X,S, p) can be regarded as lin-
ear functionals on the space Ls(X,S, p) of equivalence classes of integrable functions.
Ls(X,S, p) denotes the set of all states on Ls(X,S, p). States are a proper subset of the
dual space that contain all ‖ · ‖s -continuous linear functionals.
The space of square-integrable random variables L2(X,S, p) is a Hilbert space with
respect to the scalar product 〈·, ·〉 defined by
〈 f, g〉 .=
∫
X
f g dp f, g ∈ L2(X,S, p) (4)
For more details on the above notions (and other mathematical concepts related to
Ls-spaces used here without definition) see the standard references for the measure
theoretic probability theory [1, 2, 30, 41]. In particular, §19 in [1] and Chapter 3 in [42]
discuss further properties of the function spaces Ls(X,S, p).
The central concept that the modern mathematical theory of conditionalization is based
on is the notion of conditional expectation:
DEFINITION 2.2 ([1, p. 445]). Let (X,S, p) be a probability space, A be a σ -subalgebra
of S , and pA be the restriction of p to A. A map
E (· | A) : L1(X,S, p) → L1(X,A, pA) (5)
is called an A-conditional expectation from L1(X,S, p) to L1(X,A, pA) if (i) and (ii)
below hold:
(i) For all f ∈ L1(X,S, p), the E ( f | A) is A-measurable.
(ii) E (· | A) preserves the integration on elements of A:∫
Z
E ( f | A)dpA =
∫
Z
f dp ∀Z ∈ A. (6)
The A-measurability condition (i) should be thought of as a coarse-graining require-
ment: it entails that E ( f | A) is constant on minimal elements (atoms) in A (atoms in
A need not be atoms in S). Condition (ii) is the general form of the theorem of total
probability: it requires that from the conditional expectation one can recover the original
expectation values (hence the original probability p). For further discussion of the inter-
pretation of properties of the conditional expectation see [1].
It is not obvious that, given a σ -subalgebra A, a conditional expectation E (· | A) exists
but the Radon–Nikodym theorem entails that it always does:
PROPOSITION 2.3 ([1, p. 445], [2, Theorem 10.1.5]). Given any (X,S, p) and any
σ -subalgebraAof S , a conditional expectationE (· | A) fromL1(X,S, p) toL1(X,A, pA)
exists.
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8 ZALÁN GYENIS AND MIKLÓS RÉDEI
Note that uniqueness is not part of the claim in Proposition 2.3 because the conditional
expectation is only unique up to measure zero:
PROPOSITION 2.4 ([1, Theorem 16.10 and p. 445]; [2, p. 339]). If E ′(· | A) is another
conditional expectation then for any f ∈ L1(X,S, p) the two L1-functions E ( f | A) and
E ′( f | A) are equal up to a p-probability zero set.
Different conditional expectations equal up to measure zero are called versions of the
conditional expectation. It follows that, considered as a map on L1(X,S, p), the con-
ditional expectation is unique. We use the notation E(· | A) to denote the conditional
expectation E (· | A) when viewed as a map on L1(X,S, p).
DEFINITION 2.5 ([1, p. 430]). Given a conditional expectation E (· | A), the mapP(· | A)
defined by
S  B →P(χB | A) .= E (χB | A) (7)
is called theA-conditional probability. P(· | A) denotes the analogue map defined in terms
of E(· | A).
Note that the conditional expectation is not the conditional expected value of any random
variable—it is a map between function spaces. Nor is the conditional probability a real
valued probability measure. Conditional expected values and conditional probabilities as
real numbers can be obtained from E (· | A) andP(· | A) (see §3).
The next proposition states some basic features of the conditional expectations.
PROPOSITION 2.6 ([1, sec. 34]). A conditional expectation has the following properties:
(i) E(· | A) is a linear map.
(ii) E(· | A) is a projection:
E(E( f | A) | A) = E( f | A) ∀ f ∈ L1(X,S, p) (8)
(iii) E(· | A) preserves the unit
E(1 | A) = 1 (9)
(iv) E(· | A) is a ‖ · ‖1-contraction: ‖E( f | A)‖1 ≤ ‖ f ‖1 (i.e., E(· | A) is continuous
in the ‖ · ‖1-norm topology).
The statements (i)–(iv) also hold for E (· | A) except for p-probability zero.
Note that restricted to the Hilbert space L2(X,S, p) the conditional expectation
E(· | A) is an orthogonal projection on L2(X,S, p) with range L2(X,A, pA), a closed
linear subspace of L2(X,S, p).
A deep result of the theory of conditional expectations is that Properties (i)–(iv) in
Proposition 2.6 characterize the conditional expectation completely:
PROPOSITION 2.7 ([37, Theorem 3], [7, Corollary 1], [36]). Suppose that the map T
T : L1(X,S, p) → L1(X,S, p) (10)
is a linear, ‖ · ‖1-contractive projection preserving 1. Then there exists a σ -subalgebra A
of S such that T is the conditional expectation from L1(X,S, p) to L1(X,A, pA).
§3. Conditional probability in terms of conditional expectation. Let (X,S, p) be
a probability space, A be a σ -subalgebra of S . Assume that ψA is a ‖ · ‖1-continuous
linear functional on the subspace L1(X,A, pA) determined by a probability measure qA
given on the subalgebra A via integral (cf. equation (2)). What is the extension ψ of
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GENERAL PROPERTIES OF BAYESIAN LEARNING AS STATISTICAL INFERENCE 9
ψA from L1(X,A, pA) to a ‖ · ‖1-continuous linear functional on L1(X,S, p)? This
question is the general problem of statistical inference (see [31–33], where the relation
of statistical inference to coarse graining also is discussed both in classical and quantum
probability theory), and the answer to it is the concept of conditional probability: One is
interested in the expectation values ψ( f ) of random variables f in L1(X,S, p) that are
not in L1(X,A, pA) on condition that the expectation values of functions g that are in the
narrower set of random variables L1(X,A, pA) are prescribed (are known) and are given
by ψA(g).
In general there are many such extensions. Bayesian statistical inference yields a par-
ticular answer which is based on Bayesian conditioning via the conditional expectation
determined by the probability p and the subalgebra A:
DEFINITION 3.1 (Bayesian statistical inference). Let the extension ψ of ψA be
ψ( f ) .= ψA(E ( f | A)) ∀ f ∈ L1(X,S, p) (11)
where E (· | A) is the A-conditional expectation from L1(X,S, p) to L1(X,A, pA).
Recall that E (· | A) is a projection operator on L1(X,S, p) up to p-probability zero
(Proposition 2.6) and that state ψA is ‖ · ‖1-continuous. Thus ψ is indeed an extension of
ψA. Since E (· | A) is ‖ · ‖1-continuous, the extension ψ also is ‖ · ‖1-continuous. Thus
equation (11) defines a ‖ · ‖1-continuous extension ψ of ψA indeed.
The notion of (A, qA)-conditional probability of an event obtains as a special case of
Bayesian statistical inference so defined:
DEFINITION 3.2. If B ∈ S then its (A, qA)-conditional probability q(B) is the expectation
value ψ(χB) of its characteristic function χB computed using the formula (11) containing
the A-conditional expectation:
q(B) .= ψ(χB) = ψA(E (χB | A)) (12)
In the notation of conditional probabilityP(· | A), the (A, qA)-conditional probability
(3.2) can also be written as
q(B) =
∫
X
P(B | A)dqA (13)
Note that both the state ψA and its extension ψ in the definition of conditional proba-
bility (equations (11) and (12)) are ‖ · ‖1-continuous linear functionals (on L1(X,A, pA)
and L1(X,S, p), respectively). Thus, by Remark 2.1, the conditional probability measure,
i.e., the restriction of ψ to (the characteristic functions of the) σ -algebra S , is absolutely
continuous with respect to p. Thus the concept of Bayesian conditional probability formu-
lated in terms of conditional expectations shares with simple Bayes rule the feature that
a conditional probability is always absolutely continuous with respect to the prior proba-
bility measure. In contrast to conditional probability defined by Bayes rule, a conditional
probability given by Definitions 3.1 and 3.2 can be faithful however (see Example 7.2).
Also by Remark 2.1, if f, g ∈ L1(X,S, p) and f = g, p-almost everywhere, then their
conditional expected values are equal: ψ( f ) = ψ(g). Thus conditionalization and condi-
tional probabilities can be treated, without loss of content, on the factor space L1(X,S, p)
rather than on L1(X,S, p). This is what we will do from §4 on.
We now show that both Jeffrey conditionalization and elementary conditionalization via
the Bayes rule are particular cases of the conditional probability defined via conditional
expectations in the manner given by Definition 3.2. To see this recall first a well-known
fact from the theory of conditional expectations:
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PROPOSITION 3.3 ([1, p. 446], [2, p. 340]). Let (X,S, p) be a probability space. If
the σ -subalgebra A of S is generated by a countably infinite partition {Ai }i∈IN such that
p(Ai ) = 0 (i = 1, . . .), then the conditional expectation (5) can be given explicitly on the
characteristic functions of L1(X,S, p) as
E (χB | A) =
∑
i
p(B ∩ Ai )
p(Ai )
χAi ∀B ∈ S (14)
In particular, if S has a finite number of elements, then all conditional expectations are of
the above form (with a finite summation).
It follows that if state ψA is given on A by fixing its values ψA(χAi ) = qA(Ai ) on the
generating sets Ai , then the (A, ψA)-conditional probability q(B) of B ∈ S , B ∈ A that
Definition 3.2 specifies is
q(B) .= ψ(χB) = ψA(E (χB | A)) (15)
= ψA
(∑
i
p(B ∩ Ai )
p(Ai )
χAi
)
(16)
=
∑
i
p(B ∩ Ai )
p(Ai )
ψA(χAi ) (17)
=
∑
i
p(B ∩ Ai )
p(Ai )
qA(Ai ) (18)
For a finite partition (15)–(18) is the Jeffrey conditional rule [26]. Note that if A is
generated by a countably infinite set {Ai }i∈IN of pairwise orthogonal elements from S but
p(Ai ) = 0 for some Ai then (14) still yields the conditional expectation with the modifica-
tion that the undefined p(B∩Ai )p(Ai ) is replaced by any number—this is the phenomenon of the
conditional expectation being defined up to a probability zero set (Proposition 2.4). This
freedom also is mentioned in connection with Jeffrey conditionalization, see e.g., [44].
Simple Bayesian conditioning is a special case of Jeffrey conditioning: If the Boolean
algebra A in Proposition 3.3 is generated by two nontrivial elements A, A⊥ and we take
ψA to be the special state on the Boolean algebra A that takes the values ψA(χA) =
qA(A) = 1 and ψA(χA⊥) = qA(A⊥) = 0, then the Jeffrey conditionalization rule
(15)–(18) reduces to Bayes’ rule:
q(B) = p(B ∩ A)
p(A)
ψA(χA) + p(B ∩ A
⊥)
p(A)
ψA(χA⊥) (19)
= p(B ∩ A)
p(A)
(20)
REMARK 3.4. In light of recovering Bayes’ rule this way as a special case of condi-
tioning via conditional expectation it becomes visible that the simple Bayes’ rule (19)–(20)
is slightly deceptive: Bayes’ rule gives the impression that it is the probability measure p
that gets conditionalized by A. But in fact it is the specific probability measure qA having
the particular values qA(A) = 1 on A and qA(A⊥) = 0 on A⊥ that “gets conditionalized”
(i.e., extended from the Boolean algebra A generated by A and A⊥) to a probability
measure on the whole σ -algebra S—the role of the probability measure p is to serve as
the background measure with respect to which the extension takes place. Thus Bayes’ rule
conceals somewhat the true logical structure of conditionalization, which is the following:
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(i) The measure qA on the subalgebra A represents the conditioning conditions.
(ii) The extension q of qA to the whole algebra S yields the (A, qA)-conditional
probability on condition that the values of q are prescribed on A.
(iii) p is the fixed background probability measure with respect to which the condi-
tioned values are obtained from qA via Bayesian statistical inference.
It must be emphasized that conditionalizing using the theory of conditional expectations
in the spirit of Definitions 3.1 and 3.2 is much more general than the Jeffrey condition-
alization: a general A is not generated by a countable partition, and in such cases the
A-conditional expectation cannot be of the form (14). A classic example is the Borel-
Kolmogorov Paradox situation, which can be defused using the technique of conditional
expectations [1, p. 441], [29, p. 50–51], [9, 15, 39] (although the issue remains contro-
versial [17], [25, p. 470], [34]). The A-conditional expectation cannot even always be
given explicitly, its existence is the corollary of the Radon–Nikodym theorem, which is a
nonconstructive, pure existence theorem.
It should be noted that Jeffrey mentioned the issue of generalization of his rule of
conditionalizing in order to include the “continuous case” [26, sec. 11.8]. It was also clear
to him that “To discuss the matter more rigorously and generally, it is necessary to use
the notion of integration over abstract spaces...” [26, p. 177]. But he did not seem to have
worked out the general case systematically. Nor did he refer to the theory of conditional
expectations, which is precisely the theory developed by Kolmogorov to cover the general
case. Expositions of the mathematical theory of conditional expectations, nowadays a
standard topic in probability theory, also do not refer to Jeffrey conditionalization. It is
not clear to us why the connection has not been made, although, as we have seen, the
connection is straightforward.
§4. The Bayes accessibility relation in terms of conditional expectations.
DEFINITION 4.1. If φ is a state in L1(X,S, p) then we say that φ is Bayes accessible
for the Bayesian Agent if there exists a proper σ -subalgebra A of S and a state ψA in
L1(X,A, pA) such that conditionalizing ψA using the conditional expectation
E(· | A) : L1(X,S, p) → L1(X,A, pA) (21)
we obtain φ, i.e., if we have
φ( f ) = ψA(E( f | A)) for all f ∈ L1(X,S, p). (22)
The Bayesian interpretation of Bayes accessibility of φ is straightforward: The proba-
bility measure p represents the background knowledge of the Bayesian Agent (pA is the
restriction of p to the subalgebra A). Suppose state φ describes the expectation values of
random variables determined by some probability distribution that is given objectively.
The Agent might wish to know what this state φ is. If φ is Bayes accessible for the
Agent, then there exists a set of propositions represented by a proper σ -subalgebra A of
S such that from the evidence given by state ψA on the proper subspace L1(X,A, pA)
determined by the proper subalgebra A and by the probability representing the Agent’s
background measure, the Agent can infer and thus learn the values of φ by Bayesian
statistical inference, i.e., by Bayesian conditionalizing ψA using conditional expectations
as the conditioning device.
The qualification in Definition 4.1 that A has to be a proper σ -subalgebra is important
because every state can be obtained from itself trivially by using the identity map as condi-
tional expectation. To investigate the features of Bayesian learning it is useful however to
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drop the qualification in Definition 4.1 that A has to be a proper σ -subalgebra and define
a general Bayes accessibility relation as follows:
DEFINITION 4.2. If φ and ψ are states in L1(X,S, p) then we say that φ is Bayes
accessible from ψ (which we denote by ψ E φ), if there exists a (not necessarily proper)
σ -subalgebra A of S such that conditionalizing ψ using the conditional expectation
E(· | A) : L1(X,S, p) → L1(X,A, pA) (23)
we obtain φ; i.e., if we have
φ( f ) = ψ(E( f | A)) for all f ∈ L1(X,S, p) (24)
The relation of Definitions 4.1 and 4.2 is straightforward: Since the range of the con-
ditional expectation E(· | A) is the subspace L1(X,A, pA) of L1(X,S, p), from the
perspective of Bayes accessibility of φ from ψ only the values of ψ on L1(X,A, pA)
matter. Thus, if there exists a state ψA on the proper subspace L1(X,A, pA) from which φ
can be obtained by conditioning using the conditional expectation E(· | A) (and hence φ is
Bayes accessible for the Agent), then φ can be Bayes accessed from any extension of ψA to
a state ψ on L1(X,S, p). Conversely, if for a state φ there exists a state ψ in L1(X,S, p)
such that ψ E φ and ψ = φ, then φ is Bayes accessible for the Bayesian Agent in
the sense of Definition 4.1 because the requirement ψ = φ entails that the conditional
expectation yielding φ from ψ cannot be the identity map and therefore its range is a
proper linear subspace L1(X,A, pA) determined by a proper subalgebra A. Thus “φ is
Bayes accessible for the Bayesian Agent” is equivalent to “φ is Bayes accessible from
some ψ = φ”.
The Bayes accessibility (Definition 4.2) defines a two-place relation in the state space
L1(X,S, p) , a subset of the dual space L1(X,S, p)∗ of the space of integrable random
variables L1(X,S, p). This Bayes accessibility relation is given by the dual E(· | A)∗ of
conditional expectations E(· | A), where the dual E(· | A)∗ of E(· | A) is defined by
L1(X,S, p)  φ → E(· | A)∗φ .= φ ◦ E(· | A) ∈ L1(X,S, p) (25)
Using the Bayes accessibility relation one can define another two-place relation, which
relates elements in the set of all probability measures on S:
DEFINITION 4.3. Given the measurable space (X,S), we say that two probability mea-
sures p and q on σ -algebra S stand in the prior-posterior relation (equivalently: that
(p, q) is a prior-posterior pair) if the linear map φq defined by
L1(X,S, p)  f → φq( f ) .=
∫
f dq (26)
belongs to L1(X,S, p) and φq is Bayes accessible from some state ψ in L1(X,S, p)
in the sense of Definition 4.2. The prior-posterior pair (p, q) is called nontrivial if φq is
Bayes accessible from some state ψ different from φq , i.e., if equation (24) in Definition
4.2 is satisfied with a nontrivial proper subalgebra A of S .
The prior-posterior relation connects the inferred probability not to the evidence from
which it was inferred but to the background probability p that determines the conditional
expectation used in the inference. Hence, if for a given q there is a p such that (p, q) is a
nontrivial prior-posterior pair, this means that there exists a Bayesian Agent (namely the
one having p as background probability) for whom q is Bayes accessible in the sense of
Definition 4.1. That is to say, this Bayesian Agent can learn q from some evidence via
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conditionalization using the conditional expectation determined by p. In the prior-posterior
relation the background measure is viewed as a variable. In contrast, in the Bayes accessi-
bility relation the background measure is fixed, and the Bayes accessibility relation reflects
what a Bayesian Agent can learn from evidence on the basis of a given, fixed background
probability. These two relations thus express different aspects of Bayesian learning.
The prior-posterior relation is fairly easy to characterize: (p, q) is a prior-posterior pair
if and only if q is absolutely continuous with respect to p. The necessity of absolute
continuity is part of the definition of the prior-posterior relation because a probability
measure defined by a state in L1(X,S, p) is absolutely continuous with respect to p
(cf. Remark 2.1). To see that absolute continuity of q with respect to p is sufficient for
(p, q) to be a (not necessarily nontrivial) prior-posterior pair, note that if q is absolutely
continuous with respect to p, then by the Radon–Nikodym theorem φq ∈ L1(X,S, p)
and φq is then Bayes accessible from the state ψ = φq (i.e., from itself) because:
φq( f ) = φq
(
Ep( f | S)
) = φq (I d( f )) (27)
where I d is the identity conditional expectation. Thus the prior-posterior relation has
exactly the same properties the absolute continuity relation has: it is reflexive, transitive,
and it is not symmetric and not antisymmetric.
Since q has to be absolutely continuous with respect to p for (p, q) to be a prior-
posterior pair, it is not true that any q can be Bayes learned on the basis of any prior—
this is a well-known phenomenon already present in the simplest case of statistical
inference based on Bayes’ rule: it is impossible to raise zero probability to nonzero by
conditionalization. One can show however that for any “sufficiently nontrivial” q there is a
prior such that (p, q) is a nontrivial prior-posterior pair; i.e., that ψq is Bayes accessible for
the Agent having p as his background probability. The precise condition of “sufficiently
nontrivial” is spelled out in the hypotheses of the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4.4. Let (X,S) be a measurable space and q be a probability measure
on S such that
(A) There is an event A ∈ S with q(A) = 0 and q(A) = 1.
(B) Both A and A⊥ can be split into two subsets each having non-zero q-probability.
Then there exists a probability measure p on S such that (p, q) is a non-trivial prior-
posterior pair.
Proof. For simplicity let us assume that the support of q is X ; i.e., that the density
function (Radon–Nikodym derivative) dqdq is the constant function with value 1 on the
entire X . We prove first that there is a function h : X → R which is constant on A
and that there is a measure p on S such that
q(H) =
∫
X
hχH dp for all H ∈ S. (28)
Of course, in this case h is the Radon–Nikodym derivative dqdp . Let f : X → R be a
function such that f (x) = 1 for x ∈ A, f (x) > 0 for all x ∈ X , ∫X f dq = 1 and such
that f is not the constant function with value 1 on the entire X . Such an f exists because
by stipulation (B) event A⊥ can be decomposed into non-q-measure zero events B1 ∪ B2
and thus f can be chosen so that it is constant on B1 and B2 with different constants.
Define the measure p on S by
p(H) =
∫
X
f χH dq for all H ∈ S. (29)
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020316000502
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. London School of Economics & Political Science, on 17 Mar 2017 at 15:40:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
14 ZALÁN GYENIS AND MIKLÓS RÉDEI
This p will be the sought-after prior measure. As p(H) = ∫ χH dp = ∫ f χH dq,
it follows that f is the Radon–Nikodym derivative dpdq . Since f (x) > 0 and dqdq > 0
everywhere, the probabilities p and q are mutually absolutely continuous, therefore [18,
sec. 32, p. 136] the density functions dpdq and
dq
dp satisfy the equation
dp
dq
= 1dq
dp
This implies
q(H) =
∫
X
dq
dp
χH dp =
∫
X
1
f χH dp. (30)
So we take h = 1f . Note that h is constant on A.
Let A be the σ -subalgebra of S generated by A and all the elements {x} with x ∈ A⊥.
A simple argument shows (cf. equation (6)) that for any measure p we have
Ep(v | A)(x) =
{ 1
p(A)
∫
A v dp if x ∈ A
v(x) otherwise
∀v ∈ L1(X,S, p).
By stipulations (A) and (B) the σ -subalgebra A is a proper subalgebra of S . We need to
show now that there is a state ψ ∈ L1(X,S, p) such that
φq(v) = ψ
(
Ep(v | A)
) ∀v ∈ L1(X,S, p) (31)
Any ψ ∈ L1(X,S, p) can be represented by a density function g with respect to p:
ψ(v) = ∫ vg dp for all v ∈ L1(X,S, p). Therefore equation (31) is equivalent to
φq(v) =
∫
X
v dq =
∫
X
vh dp =
∫
X
.gEp(v | A) dp. (32)
Let us define g by
g(x) =
{ ∫
A h dp for x ∈ A
h(x) otherwise
As h is constant on A we have∫
A
vh dp =
∫
A
h dp ·
∫
A
v dp (33)
=
∫
A
g · Ep(v | A) dp (34)
=
∫
A
(∫
A
h dp ·
∫
A v dp
p(A)
)
dp (35)
And for A⊥ we have ∫
X−A
vh dp =
∫
X−A
g · Ep(v | A). (36)
Therefore by letting ψ(v) = ∫X v · g dp we obtain equation (31) and this completes the
proof. 
Stipulations (A) and (B) in Proposition 4.4 can be satisfied easily; in fact, in standard
applications they automatically hold: For a finite or countable measurable space (X,S)
it is enough to suppose that the support of q contains at least 4 elements. Conditions
(A) and (B) also hold for all probability measures that are absolutely continuous with
respect to the Lebesgue measure. There exist however “exotic” probability spaces for
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which conditions (A) and (B) do not hold. (See the example after Proposition 6.4.)
A careful examination of the proof of Proposition 4.4 reveals that (p, q) being a non-
trivial prior-posterior pair is intimately related to the Radon–Nikodym derivative dqdp being
noninjective. Indeed, this idea will be made precise in Proposition 6.2.
Every Bayesian Agent comes equipped with some background measure. It is an
important epistemological question then: What are the epistemological ramifications of
the Bayesian Agent having a particular background measure. The answer to this question
is contained in the features of the Bayes accessibility relation. This is what we study in the
following sections.
§5. Antisymmetry of the Bayes accessibility relation and failure of strong Bayes
connectedness of state spaces. We have already noted in the previous section that every
state is Bayes accessible from itself: Taking the identity map on L1(X,S, p) as the con-
ditional expectation E one can obtain any state φ as its own conditioned state. This means
that the Bayes accessibility relation E is reflexive.
PROPOSITION 5.1. The relation E is antisymmetric.
Proof. Assume ψ E φ and φ E ψ . Then there exist σ -subalgebras S1,S2 of S and
conditional expectations
E(· | S1) : L1(X,S, p) → L1(X,S1, p1) (37)
E(· | S2) : L1(X,S, p) → L1(X,S2, p2). (38)
Such that
φ( f ) = ψ(E( f | S1)) ∀ f ∈ L1(X,S, p) (39)
ψ( f ) = φ(E( f | S2)) ∀ f ∈ L1(X,S, p). (40)
Let E1 and E2 denote the orthogonal projections on L2(X,S, p) corresponding to the
conditional expectations E(· | S1) and E(· | S2). Equations (39)–(40) entail then
φ( f ) = ψ(E1 f ) ∀ f ∈ L2(X,S, p) (41)
ψ( f ) = φ(E2 f ) ∀ f ∈ L2(X,S, p) (42)
Equations (41)–(42) entail
φ( f ) = ψ(E1E2E1 f ) ∀ f ∈ L2(X,S, p) (43)
ψ( f ) = φ(E2E1E2 f ) ∀ f ∈ L2(X,S, p) (44)
and equations (43)–(44) entail that for all n ∈ IN we have
φ( f ) = ψ([E1E2E1]n f ) ∀ f ∈ L2(X,S, p) (45)
ψ( f ) = ψ([E2E1E2]n f ) ∀ f ∈ L2(X,S, p) (46)
Since φ and ψ are assumed to be ‖ · ‖1-continuous (45)–(46) entail:
φ( f ) = ψ( 1lim
n→∞([E1E2E1]
n f )) ∀ f ∈ L2(X,S, p) (47)
ψ( f ) = φ( 1lim
n→∞([E2E1E2]
n f )) ∀ f ∈ L2(X,S, p) (48)
where
1
lim denotes the limit in the ‖ · ‖1 norm.
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Since E1 and E2 are projections on the Hilbert space H = L2(X,S, p), the limits of
the operator sequences [E1E2E1]n and [E2E1E2]n exist in the sense of the strong operator
topology in the set of all bounded operators B(H) on H, the limits are the same, and the
limit is an element in the lattice P(H) of all projections on H: it is the greatest lower
bound E2 ∧E1 of the the projections E1 and E2 with respect to the standard ordering ≤ of
projections in P(H) (Proposition 4.13 in [38]). So for all f ∈ L2(X,S, p) we have
2
lim
n→∞[E1E2E1]
n f = 2lim
n→∞[E2E1E2]
n f (49)
= (E2 ∧ E1) f (50)
where
2
lim denotes the limit in the ‖ · ‖2 norm.
Since p is a bounded measure, by Jensen’s inequality one has ‖ f ‖1 ≤ ‖ f ‖2; hence the
limit of the sequences [E1E2E1]n f and [E2E1E2]n f also exists in the ‖ · ‖1 norm, and so
for all f ∈ L2(X,S, p) we have
1
lim
n→∞[E1E2E1]
n f = 1lim
n→∞[E2E1E2]
n f (51)
= (E2 ∧ E1) f (52)
Equations (47)–(48) together with (51)–(52) entail:
φ( f ) = ψ((E2 ∧ E1) f ) ∀ f ∈ L2(X,S, p) (53)
ψ( f ) = φ((E1 ∧ E2) f ) ∀ f ∈ L2(X,S, p) (54)
Since Ei ≥ (E2 ∧ E1) (i = 1, 2), we have
Ei (E2 ∧ E1) = (E2 ∧ E1) i = 1, 2 (55)
equations (41)–(42) and (53)–(54) entail that for all f ∈ L2(X,S, p) we have
φ( f ) = ψ((E2 ∧ E1) f ) (56)
= φ(E2(E2 ∧ E1) f ) (57)
= φ((E2 ∧ E1) f ) (58)
= ψ( f ). (59)
Thus φ is equal to ψ on L2(X,S, p). Since the L2(X,S, p) is ‖ · ‖1-dense in L1(X,S, p)
and φ and ψ are ‖ · ‖1-continuous, φ and ψ are equal on L1(X,S, p). 
Antisymmetry of the Bayes accessibility relation E entails that state spaces are not strongly
Bayes connected in general: it is not true that any state φ in L1(X,S, p) is Bayes acces-
sible from any other ψ in L1(X,S, p) . If strong Bayes connectedness were a feature of
a state space then every state could be learned by the Agent by Bayesian upgrading from
every other in the same state space: Given any two states φ and ψ there would always
exist a set of propositions (depending on φ of course) such that knowing the values of
ψ on elements of that set, the Agent could infer all values of φ by conditionalizing ψ
(with respect to the fixed background probability measure) on that set of propositions.
But antisymmetry of E entails that the only probability space that is strongly Bayes con-
nected is the trivial one with ∅ and X forming S . Thus in nontrivial state spaces Bayesian
learning has a certain directedness: if φ can be Bayes-learned from ψ , then ψ cannot be
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Bayes-learned from φ. What can be Bayes-learned from some evidence, cannot serve as
evidence to Bayes-learn the evidence itself.
§6. Are state spaces weakly Bayes connected? Lack of strong Bayes connectedness
of state spaces leads to the following definition:
DEFINITION 6.1. A state space L1(X,S, p) is called weakly Bayes connected if for every
state φ in L1(X,S, p) there exists a state ψ in L1(X,S, p) such that ψ = φ and φ is
Bayes accessible from ψ .
Are state spaces weakly Bayes connected? There is no general “yes” or “no” answer to
this question. We will see that some state spaces are, some others are not weakly Bayes
connected. To decide whether a state space is weakly Bayes connected is not a trivial
task. For instance we do not know whether a “small enough” state space is weakly Bayes
connected (cf. Problem 6.6) (we conjecture that it is not). We show here failure of weak
Bayes connectedness of state spaces of typical probability theories, and give an example
of a weakly Bayes connected state space. To do this, we have to separate the analysis of
weak Bayes connectedness into two parts: considering first the space L2(X,S, p) and then
L1(X,S, p). We start with the L2-theory of Bayes connectedness of state spaces.
Recall that two probability spaces (X1,S1, p1) and (X2,S2, p2) are isomorphic if there
is an invertible map f : X1 → X2 such that both f and f −1 are measurable, measure
preserving maps. A closely related notion is isomorphism modulo zero: (X1,S1, p1) and
(X2,S2, p2) are isomorphic modulo 0 if there exist sets A1 ⊆ X1 and A2 ⊆ X2 with
p1(A1) = 0 = p2(A2) such that the probability spaces (X ′1,S ′1, p′1) and (X ′2,S ′2, p′2) are
isomorphic, where X ′1 = X1A1 and X ′2 = X2A2, S ′1, and S ′2 are the natural restrictions
of the σ -algebras S1 and S2 obtained by removing the sets A1 and A2, and where p′1 and
p′2 are the restrictions of p1 and p2 to S ′1, and S ′2. If (X1,S1, p1) and (X2,S2, p2) are iso-
morphic modulo 0, then Ls(X1,S1, p1) and Ls(X2,S2, p2) are isometrically isomorphic
spaces (because in Ls spaces functions differing on null sets are identified).
Let (X,S, p) be a probability space and A be a σ -subalgebra of S . We say that A and
S are equal modulo 0 if (X,S, p) and (X,A, p) are isomorphic modulo 0. A and S being
not equal modulo zero means that there is a set A ∈ S \ A with p(A) = 0. Note that
Ls(X,A, p) is always a closed subspace of Ls(X,S, p) but equality of A and S modulo
zero implies Ls(X,S, p) = Ls(X,A, p).
The next proposition formulates a condition that is equivalent to the weak Bayes con-
nectedness of L2 state spaces. Throughout L denotes the Lebesgue σ -algebra over the
reals.
PROPOSITION 6.2. L2(X,S, p) is weakly Bayes connected if and only if there exists
no function f ∈ L2(X,S, p) which is positive f > 0, normalized ‖ f ‖2 = 1, and such
that S and f −1[L] are equal modulo 0, where f −1[L] = { f −1(A) : A ∈ L} with f −1
being the inverse image function of f .
Proof. By Riesz’s representation theorem ([1, p. 244]) for each state φ ∈ L2(X,S, p)
there exists a positive, normalized function fφ ∈ L2(X,S, p) such that
φ(g) = 〈g, fφ〉 g ∈ L2(X,S, p), (60)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the scalar product in L2(X,S, p). Conversely: every positive, normal-
ized function f in L2(X,S, p) defines a state φ f on L2(X,S, p) by φ f (g) = 〈g, f 〉 for
all g ∈ L2(X,S, p).
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Let φ,ψ ∈ L2(X,S, p) be two states, fφ and fψ be the two functions in L2(X,S, p)
that represent them in the sense of Riesz’ representation theorem. If φ is Bayes accessible
from ψ , then, by definition of Bayes accessibility, there is a σ -subalgebraA of S such that
φ(g) = ψ(E(g | A)) for all g ∈ L2(X,S, p) (61)
Denoting by EA the operator on L2(X,S, p) that represents the conditional expectation
E(· | A), and using the Riesz representatives fφ and fψ of states φ and ψ , equation (61)
can be re-written as
〈g, fφ〉 = 〈EAg, fψ 〉 for all g ∈ L2(X,S, p). (62)
Since EA is an orthogonal, selfadjoint projection, equation (62) entails
〈g, fφ〉 = 〈EAg, fψ 〉 = 〈g,EA fψ 〉 for all g ∈ L2(X,S, p). (63)
The equation 〈g, fφ〉 = 〈g,EA fψ 〉 holds for all g ∈ L2(X,S, p) if and only if
fφ = EA fψ . Thus we can conclude that if φ is Bayes accessible from some state then
fφ is in the range of an orthogonal projection EA representing a conditional expectation.
It follows that if the state φ is Bayes accessible from a state different from φ, then its
representing vector fφ must belong to a proper closed linear subspace of L2(X,S, p) that
has the form L2(X,A, p). Since the smallest closed linear subspace in L2(X,S, p) to
which fφ belongs is L2(X, f −1φ [L], p), state φ is Bayes accessible from another state only
if f −1φ [L] ⊂ S is a proper subalgebra which is not equal to S modulo 0 (for if f −1φ [L]
is a subalgebra equal to S modulo 0, then L2(X, f −1φ [L], p) is equal to L2(X,S, p)).
Consequently, L2(X,S, p) is weakly Bayes connected only if there is no positive and
normalized function f ∈ L2(X,S, p) such that S and f −1[L] are equal modulo zero.
Conversely, suppose there exists no positive and normalized function f such that S and
f −1[L] are equal modulo zero. Then for every state φ the function fφ that represents φ in
the sense of the Riesz representation theorem, L2(X, f −1φ [L], p) is a proper closed linear
subspace of L2(X,S, p). By Proposition 2.3 there exist then a conditional expectation
E(· | f −1φ [L]) from L2(X,S, p) onto L2(X, f −1φ [L], p) and (since L2(X, f −1φ [L], p) is
a proper subspace) also a positive, normalized function f ′ ∈ L2(X, f −1φ [L], p) such that
fφ = E( f ′ | f −1φ [L]). This entails 〈g, fφ〉 = 〈g,E( f ′ | f −1φ [L])〉 for all g ∈ L2(X,S, p),
which is equivalent to φ = ψ ◦ E(· | f −1φ [L]) where ψ is the state in L2(X,S, p) that
is Riesz-represented by function f ′. Thus every state in L2(X,S, p) is obtainable as a
conditioned state and so the state space L2(X,S, p) is weakly Bayes connected. 
LEMMA 6.3. If there is an injective, positive and normalized function f ∈ L2(X,S, p),
then L2(X,S, p) is not weakly Bayes connected.
Proof. If f : X → R is injective, then for all A ∈ S we have f −1( f (A)) = A. This
entails f −1[L] = S and the statement follows from Proposition 6.2. 
To state the next proposition we need to recall the notion of a standard probability space.
Intuitively, a probability space is standard if it is “the sum” of continuous and discrete
parts, where the continuous part is (measure theoretically) isomorphic to an interval with
the Lebesgue (or Borel) measure on it, and the discrete part is (measure theoretically)
isomorphic to a measure space with a σ -algebra that is either finite or is generated by a
countably infinite set. To give a more precise definition one has to define the sum (disjoint
union) of measure spaces: Let (Xi ,Si , pi ) for i < n ∈ N be finitely many measure
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spaces and suppose for convenience that the Xi ’s are disjoint sets. Define a σ -algebra S on
X = ⋃i Xi as follows: Take a subset A ⊆ X to be in S if and only if A ∩ Xi belongs to Si
for all i . Then the map p : S → R defined by
p(A) .=
∑
i
pi (A ∩ Xi ) for all A ∈ S (64)
is a measure and the measure space (X,S, p) is called the disjoint union of the measure
spaces (Xi ,Si , pi ). (For the elementary properties of a disjoint union of measure spaces
we refer to [13, sec. 214K].) A probability space is called standard if it is isomorphic
modulo zero to the disjoint union of the Borel or Lebesgue measure spaces of a (possibly
empty) interval, and a measure space with a σ -algebra that is either finite or is generated
by a countably infinite set (cf. Definition 4.5 in [35]). It is not hard to see that the disjoint
union of finitely many standard measure spaces is also standard.
Examples of standard probability spaces include all probability spaces with a finite or
countably infinite set of elementary events (“discrete” probability spaces) and the
n-dimensional Euclidean spaces Rn with probability given by a density function with
respect to the Lebesgue measure on Rn . Also included are the probability spaces where
X is a compact subset E of Rn and the probability on E is given by a density with respect
to the restriction of the Lebesgue measure to E . These probability spaces cover essentially
all applications of probability.
PROPOSITION 6.4. Let (X,S, p) be a probability space. Then L2(X,S, p) is not
weakly Bayes connected in the following (i)–(iii) cases:
(i) (X,S, p) is generated by a countable set of point masses, i.e., X is finite or
countably infinite.
(ii) (X,S, p) is isomorphic to an interval with the Borel or Lebesgue measure.
(iii) (X,S, p) is a standard probability space.
Proof. (i) Suppose X is finite or countably infinite. In this case it is clear that there exists
a measurable, injective, positive, and integrable f : X → R. By re-normalization we can
also assume that f is normalized. Then (i) follows from Lemma 6.3. For later purposes
we note that such an f can always be assumed to be bounded and hence to belong to
L∞(X,S, p) ∩ L2(X,S, p). (Take for instance X = N and f (n) = 1
n+1 .)(ii) Without loss of generality we can assume that (X,S, p) is the Lebesgue space
([0, 1],L, λ). We wish to apply Lemma 6.3 again. It is easy to see that there is an injective,
positive function f : [0, 1] → R (take, for instance, the identity function id[0,1] on [0, 1]).
Clearly f is measurable and belongs to L2([0, 1],L, λ). To make it normalized, divide it
by ‖ f ‖2. For later purposes we note id[0,1] ∈ L∞(X,S, p) ∩ L2(X,S, p).
(iii) In this case (X,S, p) is isomorphic modulo zero to a disjoint union of a (possibly
empty) interval with Lebesgue or Borel measure and a countable (possibly empty) set of
point masses. Take the union of the two injective, positive functions obtained from cases (i)
and (ii) and normalize it to length 1. Then the result follows again from Lemma 6.3. 
Proposition 6.4 shows that probability spaces are typically not weakly Bayes connected.
This leads to the question of whether weakly Bayes connected probability spaces exist
at all. We show below that they do by isolating a class of probability spaces which have
weakly Bayes connected state spaces. However, the spaces in that class are “very large”:
Call a probability space (X,S, p) significantly large if it is not isomorphic modulo zero to
any space (X ′,S ′, p′) with S ′ having cardinality less than or equal to the cardinality of the
set L of Lebesgue measurable sets. Significantly large probability spaces exist. Consider
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for instance the following example. Let X be any uncountable set, and S be the family of
sets A ⊆ X with the property that either A or its complement X  A is countable. Then
S is a σ -algebra of subsets of X , and its cardinality |S| satisfies |S| ≥ |X |. Consider the
function p : S → [0, 1] defined by p(A) = 0 if A is countable and p(A) = 1 if A
is not countable. Then p is a probability measure on S . If |X | > 22ℵ0 , then (X,S, p) is
significantly large. This is because each p-probability zero set is countable, and removing
a countable set does not change the cardinality of X . Recall that |L| = 22ℵ0 .
The next proposition motivates the definition of significantly large probability spaces.
PROPOSITION 6.5. If (X,S, p) is significantly large, then L2(X,S, p) is weakly Bayes
connected.
Proof. S cannot be equal modulo zero to f −1[L] for any f ∈ L2(X,S, p), because in
this case S would be equal modulo zero to an algebra of cardinality | f −1[L]| ≤ |L|. Thus
the result follows directly from Proposition 6.2. 
Proposition 6.5 establishes a connection between weak Bayes connectedness of the state
space of a probability space and cardinality of the σ -algebra of the propositions over which
the Bayesian Agent defines probabilities. This proposition gives a sufficient condition
for Bayes connectedness to hold: the σ -algebra of propositions must be larger than the
σ -algebra in the set of (real) numbers with respect to which measurability of the random
variables is required. It remains open whether this condition also is necessary however.
We conjecture that it is.
From the perspective of Bayesian learning, the sufficient condition for weak Bayes
connectedness contained in Proposition 6.5 is very demanding: The Bayesian Agent must
be able to comprehend a set of elementary (atomic) propositions cardinality of which is
way beyond even that of the continuum. Whether one should allow such an extremely
strong concept of Bayesian Agent, is questionable. Proposition 6.5 and its proof also
indicate in what way the demanding condition could in principle be weakened: One can
read Proposition 6.5 as saying that the cardinality of the σ -algebra in the field in which the
random variables take their value and with respect to which measurability of the random
variables are demanded give a lower bound on the cardinality of the σ -algebra of random
events for which weak Bayes connectedness can hold. To put it differently: the coarser
the random variables the smaller the minimal size of the σ -algebra of random events
that allows in principle for the corresponding probabilistic theory to be weakly Bayes
connected. Thus, as long as one considers real valued random variables in the standard
interpretation as real valued maps that are required to be Borel (or Lebesgue) measurable,
the state spaces of usual probability theories will not be weakly Bayes connected.
Propositions 6.4 and 6.5 also lead to the following open problem.
PROBLEM 6.6. Is there a non-standard probability space (X,S, p) with cardinality
|S| = |L| such that its state space L2(X,S, p) is weakly Bayes connected?
Next, we turn to the question of weak Bayes connectedness of L1-state spaces.
PROPOSITION 6.7. If (X,S, p) is a standard probability space, then L1(X,S, p) is
not weakly Bayes connected.
Proof. The proof is based on the following idea. Suppose L2(X,S, p) is not weakly
Bayes connected. Then there is a positive, normalized function f ∈ L2(X,S, p) witness-
ing it: the state φ f is not accessible from any other L2-state (cf. the proof of Proposition
6.2). Since the dual space of L1(X,S, p) is L∞(X,S, p), if f happens to belong to
L∞(X,S, p) as well, then f defines a state φ in L1(X,S, p) via
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φ(g) =
∫
f g dp for all g ∈ L1(X,S, p). (65)
We claim that such a φ is not Bayes accessible from any other state ψ ∈ L1(X,S, p) ;
thus this state will witness L1(X,S, p) not being weakly Bayes connected.
To see that φ is not Bayes accessible recall that L1-states are L2-states as well because
‖·‖1 ≤ ‖·‖2 holds due the fact that p is a bounded measure. Consequently ‖·‖1-continuity
of a state ψ ∈ L1(X,S, p) implies ‖·‖2-continuity of ψ . Thus, if φ were Bayes accessible
from ψ ∈ L1(X,S, p) , then the same ψ (being an L2(X,S, p)-state as well) would show
that the restriction φ f of φ to L2(X,S, p) is Bayes accessible; a clear contradiction. Thus
all one has to prove is that there is a function f ∈ L2(X,S, p) ∩ L∞(X,S, p) witnessing
that L2(X,S, p) is not weakly Bayes connected. But this has essentially been done in the
proof of Proposition 6.4. 
Though probability spaces with finite Boolean algebras are standard hence their state
spaces not weakly Bayes connected, we include here another proof of violation of weak
Bayes connectedness for the finite case. We do this for two reasons: First, because the
proof in the finite case shows more explicitly how violation of weak Bayes connectedness
occurs. Second, the proof will display an explicit prescription that can be used to obtain a
lot of Bayes inaccessible states.
PROPOSITION 6.8. The state space of L1(X,S, p) is not weakly Bayes connected if the
cardinality of the σ -algebra S is finite.
Proof. Let (Xn,Sn, pn) be a probability space with Xn having n < ∞ number of
elements and with Sn being the Boolean algebra of the power set of Xn . Let L1(Xn,Sn, pn)
be the associated function space. Without loss of generality we may assume that the prob-
ability measure pn is faithful, i.e., pn({xi }) = 0 for every i = 1, 2, . . . n. This is because
in the function space L1(Xn,Sn, pn) functions differing on pn-probability zero sets only
are identified, hence if pn({xi }) = 0 then the characteristic function χ{xi } of {xi } is the
zero element in L1(Xn,Sn, pn). Consequently, L1(Xn,Sn, pn) and L1(Xm,Sm, pm) will
be equal, where (Xm,Sm, pm) (m ≤ n) is obtained from (Xn,Sn, pn) by leaving out
from Xn the pn-probability zero events and taking pm({x j }) = pn({x j }) on Xm when-
ever pn({x j }) = 0. The probability measure pm is faithful then, and the state space of
L1(Xn,Sn, pn) is weakly Bayes connected if and only if the state space of L1(Xm,Sm, pm)
is. Furthermore, if pn is faithful, then L1(Xn,Sn, pn) = L1(Xn,Sn, pn) and E(· | C) =
E (· | C) for any C-conditional expectation. Thus one can carry out the calculations involv-
ing conditional expectations E(· | C) in terms of the unique version E (· | C). This will be
relied on below.
Since Xn is finite, there exist only a finite number of non-trivial Boolean subalgebras
Cl (l = 1, 2, . . . , M) of Sn ; non trivial meaning that Cl is not {∅, Xn} and is not the
full Boolean algebra Sn . Each Cl -conditional expectation E (· | Cl) has the form (cf.
Proposition 3.3)
E (χB | Cl) =
K∑
k
pn(Alk ∩ B)
pn(Alk)
χAlk
, (66)
where (for any fixed l) Alk (k = 1, 2, . . . K ) is a partition of Sn and χB is the characteristic
function of B ∈ Sn . Assume that ψ E φ. Then for some Cl we have
φ(χB) = ψ(E (χB | Cl)) for all B ∈ Sn . (67)
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Since Cl is a non-trivial Boolean subalgebra of Sn , at least one Alk in Cl has more than one
element from Xn; so if
Alk = {xlk1 , xlk2 , . . . xlkl } (68)
then there exist two distinct elements xlk1 , x
l
k2 in A
l
k . Using (66) and keeping in mind that
Alk form a partition, we can calculate the probabilities φ(χ{xlk1 }
) and φ(χ{xlk2 }
) as follows:
φ(χ{xlk1 }
) = ψ(E (χ{xlk1 } | Cl)) (69)
= ψ(
K∑
k
pn(Alk ∩ {xlk1})
pn(Alk)
χAlk
) (70)
= ψ( pn({x
l
k1})
pn(Alk)
χAlk
) (71)
= pn({x
l
k1})
pn(Alk)
ψ(χAlk
). (72)
Clearly, φ(χ{xlk2 }
) can be calculated exactly the same way and we obtain
φ(χ{xlk2 }
) = pn({x
l
k2})
pn(Alk)
ψ(χAlk
). (73)
Equations (69)–(72) and (73) entail that if ψ E φ with respect to the conditional expecta-
tion E (· | Cl), then there exist elements xlk1 = xlk2 such that
φ(χ{xlk1 }
) = pn({xlk1})
ψ(χAli
)
pn(Alk)
(74)
φ(χ{xlk2 }
) = pn({xlk2})
ψ(χAli
)
pn(Alk)
. (75)
It follows (recall that pn is faithful) that if φ is such that
φ(χ{xi })
pn({xi }) =
φ(χ{x j })
pn({x j }) i = j ; 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n (76)
then ψ E φ cannot hold for any of the finite number of conditional expectations Cl .
That for any faithful pn there exists a φ for which (76) holds follows from the following
LEMMA 6.9. Let a1, a2, . . . , an be real numbers in the semi-closed interval (0, 1] such
that
∑n
i ai = 1. Then there exist real numbers b1, b2, . . . , bn such that
bi ∈ (0, 1] i = 1, 2, . . . , n (77)
n∑
i
bi = 1 (78)
bi
ai
= b j
a j
for all i = j ; i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n (79)
Proof of Lemma. Simple induction: The case n = 2 is trivial. Assume (induction hypoth-
esis) that Lemma is true for n > 2. Let a1, a2, . . . , an+1 be numbers in (0, 1] such that∑n+1
i ai = 1. Consider the numbers a′i defined by
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a′i
.= ai∑n
i ai
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (80)
Then a′i ∈ (0, 1], and
∑n
i a
′
i = 1, so by the induction hypothesis there exist numbers
bi ∈ (0, 1] (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) such that
n∑
i
bi = 1 (81)
bi
a′i
= b j
a′j
for all i = j ; i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (82)
Which entails
bi
a′i
∑n
i ai
= b j
a′j
∑n
i ai
for all i = j ; i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n (83)
Hence
bi
ai
= b j
a j
for all i = j ; i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n (84)
Let
M = max
i
{bi
ai
: i = 1, 2, . . . n
}
(85)
and choose bn+1 such that bn+1an+1 > M . Then
bi
ai
= b j
a j
for all i = j ; i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n + 1. (86)
Re-normalizing bi (i =, 1, 2, . . . n + 1) by dividing each bi by ∑n+1i bi in order to satisfy∑n+1
i bi = 1 preserves (86). So the claim of Lemma is proved. 
The proof of Proposition 6.8 also reveals that there exist in fact a large number of
probability measures over a finite Boolean algebra that are Bayes inaccessible: There is
not only one state φ in L1(Xn,Sn, pn) which satisfies equation (76) and hence is not
Bayes accessible from any other state: For all small enough numbers  the states φ such
that
|φ(χ{xi }) − φ(χ{xi })| ≤  for all, i = 1, 2, . . . n (87)
also satisfy (76) and thus cannot be obtained via nontrivial conditionalization using condi-
tional expectations from any other state. Thus, we have:
PROPOSITION 6.10. Given a fixed probability measure representing the background
degree of belief of the Bayesian Agent on a finite Boolean algebra, there exist an uncount-
ably infinite number of states that are not Bayes accessible for the Bayesian Agent.
A similar proposition can be stated for all standard probability spaces, as well: the proof
of Propositions 6.4 and 6.7 reveals that the functions f ∈ L∞(X,S, p) ∩ L2(X,S, p)
witnessing non-weak Bayes connectedness of the state spaces Ls(X,S, p) (s = 1, 2) can
be chosen infinitely many different ways. This leads to the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 6.11. Given a fixed probability measure representing the background
degree of belief of the Bayesian Agent on a standard probability space, there exist an
uncountably infinite number of states that are not Bayes accessible for the Bayesian Agent.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020316000502
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. London School of Economics & Political Science, on 17 Mar 2017 at 15:40:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
24 ZALÁN GYENIS AND MIKLÓS RÉDEI
To sum up: Lack of weak Bayes connectedness of typical state spaces means that there
exist probabilities on σ -algebras that are not Bayes accessible for the Bayesian Agent in the
given framework: Given the Agent’s background degree of belief on the fixed set of propo-
sitions, the Agent cannot infer all probability measures via a Bayesian upgrading (using
conditional expectations as conditioning device) no matter what evidence he is provided
with—if by evidence is meant specifying a probability measure on some proper nontrivial
σ -subalgebra of the fixed set of all propositions. This shows the limits of Bayesian learning
under the condition that the evidence available for the Agent is restricted to probability
measures on σ -subalgebras of a fixed Boolean σ -algebra. Call this Restricted Evidence
Upgrading. Given the limits of Bayesian learning as displayed by Propositions 6.8, 6.7 and
6.4 characterizing Restricted Evidence Upgrading, one can ask if the Bayesian Agent can
go beyond these limits if the available evidence is not restricted to probability measures on
σ -subalgebras of a fixed σ -algebra. This issue will be investigated in §8. The next section
deals with the problem of transitivity of the Bayes accessibility relation.
§7. The Bayes accessibility relation is not transitive.
PROPOSITION 7.1. The Bayes accessibility relation E on L1(X,S, p) is not transitive
if the σ -algebra S has more than 4 elements.
Proof. We show that there exist three states ψ , φ, and ρ in L1(X,S, p) such that
ψ
E φ and φ E ρ hold but ψ  E ρ. (After this proof, an explicit elementary example of
such states will be given, see Example 7.2.)
Let A and B be two σ -subalgebras of S such that there exist elements A ∈ A  B and
B ∈ B  A such that A ∩ B = C = ∅. Note that if S has more than four elements, then
there exist σ -subalgebras A and B of S with this property: If S has more than 4 elements,
then it has at least 8 elements, and thus there are elements A and B lying in a general
position; that is to say, there exist elements A and B for which the following conditions
hold:
A ⊆ B, B ⊆ A, A ∩ B = ∅, A ∪ B = X (88)
Let A and B be the σ -subalgebras generated by A and B, respectively
A = {∅, A, A⊥, X}, B = {∅, B, B⊥, X}. (89)
Then A = B, and A and B with the assumed property exist.
Let EA and EB be the two projections on the Hilbert space L2(X,S, p) corresponding to
the A-conditional and B-conditional expectations E(· | A) and E(· | B), respectively. The
set of all projections on L2(X,S, p) form an orthocomplemented, orthomodular lattice
(see e.g., [28, 38]), where orthomodularity is the property that for any two projections Q
and R one has
if Q ≤ R then R = Q ∨ (R ∧ Q⊥). (90)
Applying (90) to Q = [EA ∧ EB] and R = EA and R = EB, we obtain
EA = [EA ∧ EB] ∨ (EA ∧ [EA ∧ EB]⊥). (91)
EB = [EA ∧ EB] ∨ (EB ∧ [EA ∧ EB]⊥). (92)
Since [EA ∧ EB] is orthogonal to both (EA ∧ [EA ∧ EB]⊥) and to (EB ∧ [EA ∧ EB]⊥),
and since the join of orthogonal projections is equal to their sum, equations (91)–(92) can
be written as
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EA = [EA ∧ EB] + (EA ∧ [EA ∧ EB]⊥). (93)
EB = [EA ∧ EB] + (EB ∧ [EA ∧ EB]⊥). (94)
The product EAEB is a projection if and only if EA and EB commute as operators.
Relations (93)–(94) show that EA and EB commute if and only if their parts outside their
intersection are orthogonal, i.e., if and only if (EA∧ [EA∧EB]⊥) and (EB∧ [EA∧EB]⊥)
are orthogonal. But (EA∧[EA∧EB]⊥) and (EB∧[EA∧EB]⊥) are not orthogonal because
by assumption there exist elements A ∈ A and B ∈ B such that A ∈ B and B ∈ A, so
the characteristic functions χA and χB of the elements A ∈ A and B ∈ B are in the range
of the projections (EA ∧ [EA ∧ EB]⊥) and (EB ∧ [EA ∧ EB]⊥), respectively, and by the
condition A ∩ B = C = 0, for the L2 scalar product 〈χA, χB〉 of χA and χB we have
〈χA, χB〉 =
∫
X
χAχBdp =
∫
X
χC dp = p(C) = 0, (95)
where we used that p is faithful on L2(X,S, p).
Since the product EAEB is not a projection, it is not equal to any projection EC that
would represent a conditional expectation E(· | C) defined by a σ -subalgebra C of S .
Thus for any such projection EC there is an element f ∈ L2(X,S, p) ⊂ L1(X,S, p)
such that
EAEB f = EC f. (96)
The state space L1(X,S, p) is separating: for any f = g in L1(X,S, p), there exists a
state ψ in L1(X,S, p) such that ψ( f ) = ψ(g), so there is a state ψ such that
ψ(EAEB f ) = ψ(EC f ). (97)
It follows that defining states φ and ρ by
φ( f ) .= ψ(E( f | A)) (98)
ρ( f ) .= φ(E( f | B)) (99)
we have ψ E φ and φ E ρ but ψ E ρ does not hold. 
We illustrate failure of transitivity of the Bayes accessibility relation with the following
example.
EXAMPLE 7.2. We give an explicit example of a probability space and three states φ,ψ
and ρ in its state space such that φ E ψ , ψ E ρ but φ E ρ does not hold.
Let X3 = {x1, x2, x3}, S3 be the power set of X3, and p3 be the uniform measure
on X3: p3({xi }) = 13 (i = 1, 2, 3). There are three nontrivial Boolean subalgebras of S ,
they are:
C1 = {∅, {x1}, {x2, x3}, X3} (100)
C2 = {∅, {x2}, {x1, x3}, X3} (101)
C3 = {∅, {x3}, {x1, x2}, X3} (102)
E(· | C1),E(· | C2) andE(· | C3) are the three conditional expectations from L1(X3,S3, p3)
to L1(X3, Ci , p3) (i = 1, 2, 3). These conditional expectations are given on the character-
istic functions χB of B ∈ S by
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020316000502
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. London School of Economics & Political Science, on 17 Mar 2017 at 15:40:41, subject to the Cambridge Core
26 ZALÁN GYENIS AND MIKLÓS RÉDEI
E(χB | C1) = p({x1} ∩ B)p({x1}) χ{x1} +
p({x2, x3} ∩ B)
p({x2, x3}) χ{x2,x3}. (103)
E(χB | C2) = p({x2} ∩ B)p({x2}) χ{x2} +
p({x1, x3} ∩ B)
p({x1, x3}) χ{x1,x3}. (104)
E(χB | C3) = p({x3} ∩ B)p({x3}) χ{x3} +
p({x1, x2} ∩ B)
p({x1, x2}) χ{x1,x2}. (105)
Let φ be the state on L1(X3,S3, p3) defined by the following probabilities:
φ(χ{x1})
.= 1
2
φ(χ{x2})
.= 1
6
φ(χ{x3})
.= 2
6
. (106)
Let ψ and ρ be the states on L1(X3,S3, p3) which are defined by
ψ( f ) .= φ(E( f | C1) (107)
ρ( f ) .= ψ(E( f | C2). (108)
So φ E ψ and ψ E ρ hold by the very definition of these states. We claim that φ E ρ
does not hold however. To see this, one can explicitly compute the values of ρ, they are:
ρ(χ{x1}) =
3
8
ρ(χ{x2}) =
1
4
ρ(χ{x3}) =
3
8
(109)
One also can compute explicitly the values of φ(E(χB | Ci )), for B ∈ L1(X3,S3, p3)
for each Ci -conditional expectation i = 1, 2, 3: For the elementary event B = {x1} these
values are:
φ(E(χ{x1} | C1)) =
1
2
(110)
φ(E(χ{x1} | C2)) =
5
12
(111)
φ(E(χ{x1} | C3)) =
1
3
(112)
Thus
φ(E(χ{x1} | Ci )) = ρ(χ{x1}) for all i = 1, 2, 3 (113)
and since Ci , (i = 1, 2, 3) are the only nontrivial Boolean subalgebras of S3, on can
conclude that φ E ρ does not hold.
Lack of transitivity of the Bayes accessibility relation makes the following definition of
finite Bayes accessibility nonredundant:
DEFINITION 7.3. A state φ ∈ L1(X,S, p) is called finitely Bayes accessible from state ψ
if there is a natural number N and there exist σ -subalgebras Ci of S (i = 1, 2, . . . N ) such
that for the corresponding conditional expectations E(· | Ci ) (i = 1, 2, . . . N ) we have
φ = ψ ◦ E(· | CN ) ◦ E(· | CN−1) ◦ · · · ◦ E(· | C1). (114)
The interpretation of finite Bayes accessibility of φ is that an Agent can genuinely Bayes-
learn from error and feedback: the Agent can learn the finitely Bayes accessible state φ
from some evidence ψ in N steps. In step i the state φi
.= ψ ◦ E(· | Ci−1) ◦ · · · ◦
E(· | C1) inferred in the preceding (i − 1)th step is looked at and it is confirmed that state
φi is correct on the subspace L1(X, Ci , pCi ) ; hence the restriction of φi to this subspace
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should be considered as new evidence and a new state φi+1 should be inferred on this
basis by conditionalizing (extending) φi from L1(X, Ci , pCi ) to L1(X,S, p) using the
conditional expectation E(· | Ci ). At the N -th step φ is learned. All this learning is taking
place while the probability measure p representing the Agent’s background knowledge is
kept fixed. From this perspective of finite Bayes learning, failure of transitivity of Emeans
that “There is no Bayesian royal road to learning” in general: Even if a state can be learned
from from an initial evidence by performing several successive steps of conditionalizing
based on feedback, this step-by-step learning cannot be shortcut in general by a single
Bayesian learning move.
Finite Bayes accessibility is relevant in situations where the Agent is receiving (partial
and revisable) probabilistic information piece by piece at certain times over a period of
time. As a hypothetical example consider a situation when the distribution of occurrence
of specific attributes in a large data set should be learned by a Bayesian learning machine
characterized by its prior probability distribution (background). The data analysis produc-
ing evidence for the Bayes-learning machine can be a process such that only the joint
occurrence of certain attributes can be extracted from the data (i.e., only the distribution
of elements in a nontrivial partition are empirically accessible) and the data analysis can
be taking place simultaneously with the machine Bayes-learning from the variable data
(evidence) supplied at successive times. The learning dynamic in this situation is described
by the learning steps defining finite Bayes accessibility.
The notion of finite Bayes accessibility leads naturally to the question of whether state
spaces are finitely strongly or weakly Bayes connected in the sense of the following defini-
tion, which is the complete analogue of Definition 6.1:
DEFINITION 7.4. The state space L1(X,S, p) is said to be
• finitely strongly Bayes connected if any state φ ∈ L1(X,S, p) is finitely Bayes
accessible from any state ψ ∈ L1(X,S, p) ;
• finitely weakly Bayes connected if for any state φ ∈ L1(X,S, p) there exists state
ψ ∈ L1(X,S, p) such that φ is finitely Bayes accessible from ψ , and φ = ψ .
Finite strong/weak Bayes connectedness is a weakening of strong/weak Bayes connect-
edness; thus, in principle, it is easier for a state space to be finitely strongly/weakly Bayes
connected than just being strongly/weakly Bayes connected. It is clear however that if state
φ is Bayes inaccessible then it also is finitely Bayes inaccessible because if it is finitely
Bayes accessible then it can be obtained in the form (114) hence it is Bayes accessible
from ψ ◦ E(· | CN−1) ◦ · · · ◦ E(· | C1) and thus it is Bayes accessible. So we have
PROPOSITION 7.5. If a state space is not weakly Bayes connected then it is not finitely
weakly Bayes connected.
As a corollary of Propositions 6.7 and 7.4 we have in particular:
PROPOSITION 7.6. State spaces of standard probability measure spaces are not finitely
weakly Bayes connected (hence they are not finitely strongly Bayes connected either).
Though standard probability spaces include all finite spaces, to explore the behavior of
finite weak Bayes connectedness it is illustrative to provide a direct proof of failure of finite
strong Bayes connectedness in probability spaces having a finite number of events. This is
our next proposition.
PROPOSITION 7.7. Suppose S is finite. Then L1(X,S, p) is not finitely strongly Bayes
connected.
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Proof. Suppose C is a σ -subalgebra. Then it is generated by a partition (Ak)k∈nC ⊆ X
and by Proposition 3.3 the C-conditional expectation E(χB | C) is given by
E(χB | C) =
∑
i
p(B ∩ Ai )
p(Ai )
χAi (B ∈ S) (115)
(where in case of p(Ai ) = 0 the coefficient of χAi can be set arbitrarily. As conditional
expectations are unique up to measure zero, we may assume without loss of generality that
in case p(Ai ) = 0 the coefficient of χAi is 0). Each measurable f : X → R is a sum of
characteristic functions
f =
∑
x∈X
f (x)χ{x}
therefore if a state is defined on all χ{x}, then it extends uniquely to L1(X,S, p).
Enumerate the range of p. As S is finite, our enumeration is finite as well and we can
write the range ran(p) of p as
ran(p) = {rk : 1 ≤ k ≤ K}.
Consider the field extension F = Q[r1, . . . , rK ] (for the theory of field extensions we refer
to [40]). It is clear that all the coefficients in equation (115) belong to the field F. Since
ran(p) is finite, we have
Q[r1, . . . , rK ] = R.
Observe that if ψ takes values from F on all χ{x}, then the same holds for ψ ◦ E(· | C) for
any C, since all the coefficients in equation (115) are in F.
Choose now any ψ which takes values from F on all the χ{x}’s (x ∈ X ) and suppose φ
takes values from R F on each χ{x}. Then
φ(χ{x}) = ψ ◦ E(χ{x} | CN ) ◦ E(χ{x} | CN−1) ◦ · · · ◦ E(χ{x} | C1),
for any N , since the right hand side of the equation belongs to F, while the left hand side
is in R F. 
As the proof of Proposition 7.1 shows, the failure of transitivity of the Bayes accessibility
relation is a consequence of noncommutativity of the projections EA and EB representing
the conditional expectations determined by some σ -subalgebrasA and B of σ -algebra S . It
is not true however that all subalgebrasA and B of S determine noncommuting projections
EA and EB. For instance, if A is a sub-Boolean algebra of B, then EA is a sub-projection
of EB and these projections commute. More generally, if Ci (i = 1, 2, . . .) is a series of
σ -subalgebras of S such that Ci ⊂ C j for i < j (such a series is called a “filtration”
[1, p. 458]) then by the “tower property” of conditional expectations [1, Theorem 34.4]
we have
E(E(· | C j ) | Ci ) = E(· | Ci ) (i < j) (116)
which in turn entails the commutativity of the Hilbert space projections representing
E(· | C j ) and E(· | Ci ). Thus in any such particular series of Bayesian learning steps
transitivity holds. Furthermore, if B is a subalgebra such that B = ∪iCi , then the (upward)
martingale theorem (Theorem 35.6 in [1]) says that for any ψ in L1(X,S, p) we have
ψ ◦ E(· | B) = lim
i
ψ ◦ (E(· | Ci )). (117)
(The limit is to be taken in the pointwise topology in the state space: φn → φ if φn( f ) →
φ( f ) for all f ∈ L1(X,S, p).) Performing repeated conditionalization with respect to
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subalgebras forming a filtration describes a Bayesian learning process in which the inferred
probabilities in the first step using conditionalization with respect to Boolean algebra C1
are confirmed as correct (for instance as describing empirically observed frequencies) on
all larger algebras Ci (i > 1), because the tower property (116) entails that the finite Bayes
accessibility relation defined by equation (114) reduces to
φ = ψ ◦ E(· | CN ) ◦ E(· | CN−1) ◦ · · · ◦ E(· | C1) = ψ ◦ E(· | C1). (118)
The martingale equation (117) also can be interpreted as a formulation of the phe-
nomenon known as “washing out of priors” (Chapter 6, sec. 4 in [8]), and this can be
used to clarify the relation of this phenomenon to the Bayes inaccessibility of a state for
an Agent: If the filtration covers the whole S , i.e., S = ∪iCi , then, as a special instance of
equation (117) we have:
ψ = lim
i
ψ ◦ (E(· | Ci )). (119)
In equation (119) all the conditional expectations E(· | Ci ) are defined with respect to the
background probability (prior) p that determines the function space L1(X,S, p) on which
E(· | Ci ) act. One can however take another probability measure q and form L1(X,S, q).
Then, if state ψ is such that it also belongs to the state space L1(X,S, q) , then the
filtration Ci defines the series of conditional expectations Eq(· | Ci ) on L1(X,S, q), and
the martingale theorem applied to this series of conditional expectations yields
ψ = lim
i
ψ ◦ (Eq(· | Ci )). (120)
Thus either p or q can be taken as prior to obtain ψ as a limit of the conditioned probabil-
ities ψ ◦ (Eq(· | Ai )) provided Ci is a filtration covering (in the limit) the whole algebra
S—the prior “gets washed out” in the limit. This holds for any ψ that belongs to both
L1(X,S, p) and L1(X,S, q) ; in particular this holds for a ψ that is not Bayes accessible
for an Agent having p as his background measure and which is not Bayes accessible for an
Agent having q as background either. Recall (Definition 4.1) that the Bayes inaccessibility
for an Agent of ψ in L1(X,S, p) and L1(X,S, q) means that
ψ = ψ ◦ (E(· | Ci )) for any i such that Ci ⊂ S. (121)
ψ = ψ ◦ (Eq(· | Ai )) for any i such that Ci ⊂ S. (122)
That is to say, while ψ can be obtained as a limit of both ψ ◦(E(· | Ci )) and ψ ◦(Eq(· | Ci ))
if in the limit Ci covers S , at no stage along the limit can we obtain ψ if at that stage the
conditionalization is with respect to a proper subalgebra of S .
It should be noted that the right hand sides of the martingale equations (119) and (120)
represent a series of individual, disconnected Bayesian inferences rather than a connected
Bayesian learning process as understood in the concept of finite Bayes accessibility: every
conditionalization ψ ◦ E(· | Ci ) and ψ ◦ Eq(· | Ci ) is a Bayesian inference that infers
probabilities of events in S from probabilities on Ci (with respect to priors p and q,
respectively). But the result of the i-th inference does not play any role in the (i + 1)−th
inference in this series, in contrast to the series of inferences in the concept of finite Bayes
accessibility.
One also should be aware of the limitation of the washing out of prior phenomenon
resulting from the hypothesis under which it holds: Given a state ψ to learn, the probability
measures p and q cannot be arbitrary: They must be such that ψ belongs to both of the
state spaces L1(X,S, p) and L1(X,S, q) otherwise equations (119) and (120) are not
meaningful. In other words, p and q must be such that the probability measure ψ defines
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on S is absolutely continuous with respect to both p and q. This is a very heavy constraint
limiting the scope of truth of the claim that priors do not matter in the long run. For further
discussion of the limits of washing out of priors we refer to (Chapter 6, sec. 4 in [8]).
§8. Bayes connectability in terms of conditional expectations. Failure of weak
Bayes connectedness of state spaces displays the limits of Bayesian learning under Limited
Evidence Upgrading: the evidence available for the Agent is limited to probability mea-
sures on σ -subalgebras of the fixed σ -algebra on which the Agent’s background probability
is given. It is natural however to ask what the Agent can learn via conditionalization
using conditional expectations if he is allowed access to potentially unlimited evidence.
To investigate this question, we define first the concept of extensions of state spaces.
DEFINITION 8.1. We say that the state space L1(X ′,S ′, p′) extends the state space
L1(X,S, p) if the following hold:
(i) There is a measurable, measure preserving map h : X ′ → X such that its inverse
image function f −1 induces a σ -algebra embedding h−1 : S → S ′.
(ii) The σ -algebra embedding preserves the probability: For all A ∈ S we have
p(A) = p′(h−1(A)).
If (i)–(ii) hold, then the embedding of S into S ′ via f −1 can be lifted to an isometric
embedding h¯ : L1(X,S, p) → L1(X ′,S ′, p′) by defining h¯ in the natural way: For a
function f ∈ L1(X,S, p) let h¯( f ) = f ◦ h (see the figure below). Since h is measurable,
we have h¯( f ) ∈ L1(X ′,S ′, p′).
X R
X ′ R
f
h id
f ◦ h
Note that h¯ is isometric because
‖h¯( f )‖1 =
∫
X ′
| f ◦ h|dp′ =
∫
X
| f |dp = ‖ f ‖1 (123)
The image of h¯ is thus a closed subspace in L1(X ′,S ′, p′); hence for each state φ ∈
L1(X,S, p) there is a corresponding state φ¯ ∈ h¯(L1(X,S, p)) such that
φ¯
(
h¯( f )) = φ( f ) for all f ∈ L1(X,S, p) (124)
By the Hahn–Banach theorem φ¯ extends to a continuous linear functional φ′ ∈
L1(X ′,S ′, p′) . Notice that φ¯ can have many such extensions, in general. Any such φ′
is called an extension of φ.
DEFINITION 8.2. The state space L1(X,S, p) is called weakly Bayes connectable if there
is a state space extension L1(X ′,S ′, p′) such that each φ ∈ L1(X,S, p) has an extension
φ′ ∈ L1(X ′,S ′, p′) which is Bayes accessible from some ψ ∈ L1(X ′,S ′, p′) , ψ = φ′.
The above definition is a significantly generalized version of the definition given by
Diaconis and Zabell [4, sec. 2.1]. Accordingly, the proposition below generalizes Theo-
rem 2.1 in [4].
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PROPOSITION 8.3. State spaces L1(X,S, p) are weakly Bayes connectable.
Proof. Let φ be a state in L1(X,S, p) . We have to construct a state space extension
L1(X ′,S ′, p′) such that the extension φ′ ∈ L1(X ′,S ′, p′) of φ ∈ L1(X,S, p) is Bayes
accessible from some ψ ∈ L1(X ′,S ′, p′) . The idea of the proof is the following. We
take as the extension of L1(X,S, p) the product of L1(X,S, p) with another probability
space (Y,B, q). The product structure defines a conditional expectation to the components
in the product in a canonical manner, and it also makes possible to extend states defined on
the components in different ways. We display two extensions of φ that will be shown to be
related to each other via conditioning with respect to the canonical conditional expectation.
Let (Y,B, q) be the Lebesgue measure space over the unit interval and consider the usual
product space
(X × Y,S ⊗ B, p × q), (125)
where p × q is the product measure: (p × q)(A × B) = p(A)q(B).
The function
X × Y  (x, y) → h(x, y) .= x ∈ X (126)
is a measurable, measure preserving map and its inverse image induces a σ -algebra em-
bedding h−1 : S → S ′, since for all A ∈ S we have
h−1(A) = A × Y ∈ S ′ (127)
p(A) = p′(A × Y ) = p(A)q(Y ) (128)
h can be lifted to an isometric embedding h¯ : L1(X,S, p) → L1(X ′,S ′, p′) by the
definition
h¯( f ) = f¯ = f ◦ h f ∈ L1(X,S, p). (129)
In what follows, for notational convenience we write L1(X) and L1(X × Y ) instead of the
longer L1(X,S, p) and L1(X ′,S ′, p′), and, to make notation easier to read, we write ∫ dx
and
∫
dy instead of
∫
dp and
∫
dq.
The general definition of extension of state spaces (Definition 8.1) in the present context
means that if φ ∈ L1(X) is a state, then φ′ ∈ L1(X × Y ) is its extension if for all
f ∈ L1(X) we have
φ′
( f¯ ) = φ( f ). (130)
If α ∈ L1(Y ) is a state in the second component of the product space (125), then we
define the α-extension of φ (denoted by φα) to be a state in L1(X × Y ) by setting for any
f ∈ L1(X × Y )
φα( f ) .= α
(
y → φ(x → f (x, y))). (131)
Then φα is an extension of φ because for each f ∈ L1(X) we have
φα( f¯ ) = φα( f ◦ h) = α
(
y → φ(x → ( f ◦ h)(x, y))) (132)
= α(y → φ(x → f (x))) = α(y → φ( f )) (133)
= φ( f ) · α(y → 1) = φ( f ) · α(1) = φ( f ). (134)
A particular state α is given by α(g) = ∫Y g dy (for all g ∈ L1(Y )). For this α the
α-extension φα of φ is
φ¯( f ) =
∫
Y
(
y → φ(x → f (x, y))) dy. (135)
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Take the σ -subalgebra A = {A × Y : A ∈ S} of S × B (which is isomorphic to S).
Then the A-conditional expectation is
E( f | A)(x, y) =
∫
Y
f (x, y) dy. (136)
We claim that for any α ∈ L1(Y ) the state φ¯ is Bayes accessible from φα using the
A-conditional expectation as upgrading device; i.e., that we have
φ¯( f ) = φα(E( f | A)). (137)
To show this, note first that, since the dual space L1(X,S, p)∗ is L∞(X,S, p) ([27,
Theorem 1.7.8]), there is a function g ∈ L∞(X) such that
φ( f ) =
∫
X
f (x)g(x) dx for all f ∈ L1(X). (138)
Then for all f ∈ L1(X × Y ) we have
φ¯
( f ) =
∫
Y
(
y → φ(x → f (x, y))) dy (139)
=
∫
Y
∫
X
f (x, y)g(x) dxdy. (140)
Using the formula (136) giving the conditional expectation E(· | A) and changing the order
of integrals below (allowed by Fubini’s theorem) we can calculate then
φ
(
E( f | A)) = φ(x →
∫
Y
f (x, y) dy) =
∫
X
∫
Y
f (x, y) dy g(x) dx (141)
=
∫
X
∫
Y
f (x, y)g(x) dy dx =
∫
Y
∫
X
f (x, y)g(x) dx dy (142)
=
∫
Y
(
y → (
∫
X
f (x, y)g(x) dx)) dy (143)
=
∫
Y
(
y → (x → φ(x → f (x, y))) dy (144)
= φ¯( f (x, y)). (145)
Using (141) and (145) the claim (i.e., equation (137)) follows easily:
φα
(
E( f | A)) = α(y → φ(E( f | A))) (146)
= α(φ¯( f )) (147)
= φ¯( f )α(x → 1) (148)
= φ¯( f )α(1) = φ¯( f ). (149)
To complete the proof one has to show that there exists an α in L1(Y ) such that φα =
φ¯. But this is clear: take any continuous, nonconstant function t : Y → R for which∫
Y t (y) dy = 1 and put α(g) =
∫
g(y)t (y) dy.
Thus we proved that φ has different extensions φ¯ and φα such that
φ¯
( f ) = φα(E( f | A)). (150)

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Proposition 8.3 shows that a Bayesian Agent can learn in principle everything that can
be formulated in terms of a probability measure on a fixed σ -algebra—provided the Agent
has access to a potentially unlimited supply of evidence. In this sense a Bayesian Agent
has unlimited learning capacity.
Note that it is not part of our claim that the additional evidence the Agent needs to have
in order to learn a Bayes inaccessible state must be formulated in terms of the product ex-
tension of the original probability space the proof of Proposition 8.3 uses. Other extensions
might very well transform a Bayes inaccessible state into a Bayes learnable one. It is even
to be expected that Bayes learnability of a state via extending might depend sensitively on
how the Agent extends the original probability space to accommodate new knowledge.
One may wonder whether state spaces are Bayes connectable in a stronger sense than
specified by Definition 8.2; i.e., whether it holds that given any pair of states φ and ψ in
L1(X,S, p) such that φ is not Bayes accessible from ψ there exists an extension in which
φ is Bayes accessible from ψ . To give the precise definition of strong Bayes connectability
of state spaces, we define first the concept of in principle Bayes accessibility:
DEFINITION 8.4. Given a state space L1(X,S, p) , a state φ in it is called in prin-
ciple Bayes accessible from another state ψ = φ if there exists a state space exten-
sion L1(X ′,S ′, p′) of L1(X,S, p) such that the extension of φ from L1(X,S, p) to
L1(X ′,S ′, p′) is Bayes accessible from the extension of ψ from L1(X,S, p) to
L1(X ′,S ′, p′).
DEFINITION 8.5. The state space L1(X,S, p) is called strongly Bayes connectable if any
state φ is in principle Bayes accessible from any other state ψ .
PROBLEM 8.6. Are state spaces strongly Bayes connectable?
We do not know the answer to the above question.
§9. Summary and closing comments. Bayesian learning is a particular way of
inferring unknown probabilities from known ones. The specificity of this kind of learning
is that the inference is conditionalizing: the inferred probability measure is obtained by
conditionalizing the known probability measure. We argued in this paper that condition-
alizing should be carried out in terms of conditional expectations. We have seen that
conditionalizing using this technique, which is standard in mathematics, includes both the
elementary Bayes rule and Jeffrey conditionalization as special cases. We have shown that
adopting this viewpoint leads naturally to regarding conditionalization as a two-place rela-
tion E in the state space determined by the reference probability measure representing the
background subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian Agent. The interpretation of ψ E φ
is that the Agent can learn the probabilities given by φ from the evidence represented
by probabilities given by ψ ; where “learning φ from ψ” means “conditionalizing ψ one
obtains φ”. Finding out the properties of the relation E amounts to characterizing Bayesian
learning in its abstract, general form.
We have proved that the Bayes accessibility relation E is reflexive, antisymmetric,
and nontransitive. We also have investigated the connectivity properties of state spaces
with respect to the Bayes accessibility relation E. We have shown that state spaces are
typically not weakly Bayes connected. That is to say, we proved that, given a measure
representing the background degrees of belief of a Bayesian Agent, there exist states
(probability measures) that cannot be learned by the Agent from any evidence the Agent is
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capable of formulating within the confines of a given probability measure space. Failure of
weak Bayes connectedness seems to pose a serious challenge for Bayesian learning: The
existence of Bayes inaccessible states (we have proved that there exist an uncountably
infinite number of such states in the typical cases) means that an Agent’s background
measure might prohibit the Agent from learning the “true” probability measure. By saying
that a probability (measure) is “true” we only mean here that the probability measure is
the one the Agent wishes to learn. The measure to be learned can be “true” in the sense
of reflecting some objectively determined distribution (frequencies, ratios, etc.). But it also
can be the degree of belief of another Agent. Nothing of what we presented in this paper
depends on the specific nature of “true”. Note also that an assignment of truth values
true and false to elements of the Boolean algebra S that is in harmony with classical
propositional logic is a specific probability measure, so learning such truth values is a
specific case of learning a probability measure. If the true probability measure happens
to be one of the Bayes inaccessible ones, the Agent cannot learn it by conditionalizing.
Metaphorically speaking: The Agent’s background degrees of belief creates “Bayes blind
spots” for the Agent. Thus the Agent’s background knowledge proves to be crucial from the
perspective of what the Agent can in principle learn from possible evidence. In particular,
the state spaces of standard probability measure spaces are not weakly Bayes connected.
This is a very large class that includes most applications. In these probability theories the
true probability measure to be learned might remain inaccessible for the Bayesian Agent.
We also have seen that lack of weak Bayes connectedness cannot be “cured” by weakening
weak Bayes connectedness to finite weak Bayes connectedness.
A natural question that arises is how “large” the Bayes Blind Spot is. There is no unique
answer to this question, in part because there is no unique measure to gauge the size of a
set: In addition to asking what its cardinality is, one can enquire about its topological size
with respect to some topology in the state space and also about its size with respect to some
natural measure on the state space. The paper [16] investigates the problem of size of the
Byes Blind Spot in the case where the Boolean algebra is finite. It turns out that the Bayes
Blind Spot in this case is as large as possible both in cardinality, in the sense of topology
and in the natural measure: The Bayes Blind Spot is a set of second Baire category and
its complement, the set of Bayes accessible states is a measure zero set. The topological
and measure theoretic sizes of the Bayes Blind Spot of standard probability spaces are
not known.
A Bayesian Agent might try to overcome the epistemological difficulty posed by Bayes
inaccessible states by widening the probabilistic framework in which Bayes inaccessible
states are present. This strategy involves enlarging the σ -algebra of propositions stating
features of the world, extending the background probability to the enlarged set, and looking
for evidence about (probabilities of) some subset of the enlarged σ -algebra—all this in the
hope of becoming able to Bayes-learn those probabilities in the broader framework that are
inaccessible in a narrower probability theory. We showed that such a strategy is in principle
viable: a Bayes inaccessible state becomes Bayes learnable from some state after a suitable
embedding of the original probability space into a larger one. Thus, a Bayesian Agent has
unlimited learning capacity if he is allowed to expand the propositional base of possible
evidence. It is even possible to enlarge the probability space into one in which Bayes
inaccessible states do not exist and thus every probability is Bayes learnable from some
evidence: We showed that state spaces of large enough probability spaces are weakly Bayes
connected. A Bayesian Agent can only do such an extension however if he is capable of
comprehending a very large amount of propositions: The σ -algebra of the probability space
which could be shown having a Bayes connected state space had cardinality larger than the
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cardinality of the set of Lebesgue measurable subsets of real numbers. Since the cardinality
of the set of Lebesgue measurable sets itself is already beyond the continuum, one needs
an extremely strong concept of Bayesian Agent to allow for this option. A Bayesian Agent
with a more modest mental capacity has to be aware however that he is on an unended
quest: for him in every probability space he is able to comprehend there exist probability
statements that might be true but he only can learn them from evidence that can be gathered
only by going beyond the framework in which the true probability is formulated. Whether
the concept of a powerful Bayesian Agent is reasonable, and whether the notion of a modest
Bayesian Agent is attractive, we do not wish to try to decide here.
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